Whose Law Is the Republic's Law?

Whose Law Is the Republic's Law?

The Lawyer-Worker Was Left Outside the Ballot

Dear Young Comrades,

The new president of the Istanbul Bar Association was decided this evening: Ümit Kocasakal, after ten years. A week ago the board changed hands in Izmir too. Two readings are circulating on social media. One says "the fascists won." The other calls on us to understand nationalism and leaves class for later. Both erase the lawyer-worker. We will put that person first.

The lawyer-worker is the lawyer who sells their labour power to a firm, to a company, or to the state's compulsory-defence tariff. The profession calls them a wage lawyer, işçi avukat. The salaried lawyer in a large firm, the unpaid trainee, and the young lawyer who lives on delayed CMK assignments are three forms of this relation. CMK is the compulsory criminal-defence work paid on the state's tariff. At the top sit the large law firms and corporate practice. The great majority of the Istanbul Bar's 68,000 members are no longer in independent practice. The election was held on top of this relation. It was not held about this relation.

The lists that put the lawyer-worker's wage, the trainee's pay, and the CMK tariff at the centre of their programme stayed at 18 per cent together. Two ideological fractions of the ruling class split the ballot: the "unitary state" and "rights-based democracy." What lost was the lawyer-worker's agenda. Nationalism is not the name of that loss. It is the wrong address of this anger. It bills the boss's invoice to the nation and to the foreigner. The question of this piece is: who will bind the lawyer-worker's anger to the relation that turned them into a wage-earner?

Summary

The subject of this ballot is the lawyer-worker. The bar, in which 68,000 lawyers hold the vote, is no longer a lodge of independent practice. It is a workplace divided by the wage, the traineeship, and CMK. The election talked about that workplace's patronage and its ideology. It did not talk about labour power.

Kocasakal came first with 34 per cent. Three lists fed by the same Kemalist-republican basin took more than 60 per cent of the ballot together. In 2024, while that basin was scattered, the Kaboğlu board elected by a coalition kept its vote and could not grow it. In Izmir the same shift happened by a narrower margin. Aykırı reports that in Ankara the TÜMAG candidate Doğukan Kozan approached half the vote. That is not our count. We do not add Ankara as a percentage until a full tally is published. The direction is the same: in the three largest cities the nationalist basin grew by covering the lawyer-worker's agenda.

This is not a personal victory. The ruling class's "Republic" fraction took the professional chamber back. The ballot brought down the board that the government could not bring down through the courts. The will that brought it down was not the lawyer-worker's will. It was a current assembled through identity. The anger of that current comes from proletarianisation: the lawyer, the teacher, and the engineer are turned into wage-earners without savings, and the bridge from education to employment in front of the young is torn down. Nationalism takes this anger out of the class contradiction and invests it in the nation-foreigner contradiction.

Saying "they are all fascists" does not read the address. Saying "let us understand" and postponing class leaves the anger with the cadre that has already collected it. The right question is who will draw the lawyer-worker's anger into the name of what turned them into a wage-earner.

Who Is the Lawyer-Worker?

The lawyer-worker is wage labour under the appearance of an attorney. They work on a salary in a large firm, and that salary is often a little above the minimum wage. The trainee among them works unpaid. The one who cannot open their own office lives on CMK assignments and waits months for the payment. Opposite them stand the large law firm and the corporate lawyer. One sells labour power. The other turns that labour power into the case and into the company's law. The bar's 68,000 members are not, for this reason, a single mass of "colleagues." Two classes stand on the same roll.

Who put this structure at the centre of their programme in the election? Dinç, with a bill that would pay trainees a salary like candidate judges, at 4.9 per cent. Selanik, who proposed that CMK fees be paid from the bar's fund within 30 days without waiting for the ministry, at 12.8 per cent. Together they are the lawyer-worker's agenda, and together they stayed at 18 per cent. Kocasakal's CMK algorithm also answers a real demand, but it does not enlarge the pie. It reorders the slices. Priority for young lawyers with 0–10 years of seniority, a lawyers' lift at the courthouse, a bank promotion: distributive justice. The state and big capital, which set the size of the pie — the CMK tariff, the lawyer-worker's wage, and the trainee's pay — were not spoken of at all in this election.

What was spoken of was "the first four articles," "the unitary structure," "the rights-based bar," and the LGBTI+ flag. Two ideological fractions of the ruling class fought. The nationalist wing consolidated the firms under the flag of "saving the state." The liberal-democratic wing consolidated the NGOs under the flag of "saving rights." The lawyer-worker was in neither. The identity axis stopped a class axis from forming. Both sides benefited.

The Ballot Turned on Top of This Relation

The numbers are the record of that cover. In Istanbul, 68,220 lawyers had the right to vote; close to 29,000 voted. The count of 168 ballot boxes ranks as follows:

Candidate	List	Votes	Share
Ümit Kocasakal	Republican Unity of Forces	9,970	34.1%
İbrahim Kaboğlu (sitting president)	Lawyers for Change	6,830	23.4%
Atakan Selanik	Republican Lawyers	3,731	12.8%
Hasan Kılıç	Principle First Contemporary Lawyers	3,491	12.0%
Korkut Kanadoğlu	Lawyers' Rights Group	2,485	8.5%
Arife Gökkaya Dinç	Independent Lawyers	1,444	4.9%
Three other candidates	—	1,260	4.3%

Kaboğlu had been elected in 2024 with 7,197 votes; this time, 6,830. He kept his own base, but he stood still while the electorate grew by 4,000. Kocasakal, Selanik, and Kılıç are all fed by the same Kemalist-republican basin; together they are over 17,000. In 2024 that basin had split into three or four pieces, and the coalition passed through the gap of that split. This time the split continued, but the largest piece was enough on its own.

Another reading circulated on election night: had there been no Bar No. 2, Kaboğlu would have won, and Kocasakal was "the lesser evil." The person who wrote this says the real crowd is the divided centrist republicans. Neither sentence is a count. How many votes the lawyers who moved to Bar No. 2 would have cast is not in this tally. One cannot say "would have won" with votes that are not there. "The lesser evil" is a sentence that closes the class question: it legitimises the anger in the hands of the cadre that has already collected it.

In Izmir, on 18 October, the same thing happened by a narrower margin. Serhat Sökmen of the Republican Lawyers' Group passed Emre Öktem of Contemporary Lawyers (2,523) by 101 votes, with 2,624. For years the Izmir Bar Association was one of the most visible bars in human-rights cases, in files coming from the Kurdish provinces, and in the F-type prison and hunger-strike processes. The change of hands there runs in the same direction.

We do not have the same tally for Ankara. Aykırı writes that the TÜMAG candidate Doğukan Kozan received close to 50 per cent of the votes. Young lawyers who had held office in the MHP, the Zafer Party, and the İYİ Party united behind him; the campaign was built on Atatürk nationalism. This report does not say whether Kozan was elected president. What it says is that nationalist votes grew in the three largest cities in the same week.

Kocasakal's campaign and his first statements make the direction plain. In an interview with Cumhuriyet he said the "Terror-Free Turkey" process and the debate on a new constitution would sacrifice the nation-state and the unitary structure, and that the sitting board had "opened the first four articles to debate." He promised to return the bar to "the line of the Republic and the Atatürk revolutions." The election-night celebration was held with the slogans "Ne mutlu Türküm diyene" ("How happy is the one who says I am a Turk") and "Mustafa Kemal'in askerleriyiz" ("We are Mustafa Kemal's soldiers"), and with the Tenth Anniversary March sung under his lead. In images Aykırı published the same night, supporters march to the Izmir March, and behind Kocasakal many lawyers make the grey-wolf sign. Perinçek, leader of the Vatan Party, saluted the result with "The Istanbul Bar Association is on the course of the Turkish Revolution." His professional promise, as we said in the section on the lawyer-worker, is a distributive justice that does not enlarge the pie.

The two years of the Kaboğlu board opposite him will be remembered for two things. First, the cases the bar joined as an institution: Cerattepe, the Dilovası workplace killings, the earthquake cases, Kartalkaya, the Saraçhane detentions of March 2025, the newborn gang. Second, the cases opened over their statement on the journalists Nazım Daştan and Cihan Bilgin, killed in northern Syria in December 2024: an acquittal in the criminal case in January 2026, affirmed by the appeals court on 21 October; but the March 2025 civil ruling to "remove the board" is still on appeal. The government tried to bring this board down through the courts and failed. The ballot did what the government could not. Let us set that aside; we will come back to it.

What happened in the hall on the first day of the General Assembly is symbolic too. After one candidate's speech an LGBTI+ flag was opened, a brawl broke out, and the assembly stopped for fifteen minutes. Evrensel's headline summed up the picture: "No pledge at the rostrum, chauvinism and a brawl in the hall."

History Did Not Make the Lawyer-Worker the Subject

Dear comrades, this ballot is not new. The history of the Istanbul Bar Association is not the history of the lawyer-worker. It is the history of whose hands the state has held the law in. At every break the bar has either clashed with the state or been reshaped by the state. The lawyer-worker has not been the subject of this history. Sometimes the person defended was a worker, sometimes a revolutionary. The defender was never organised as wage labour.

The Ottoman period and the founding. The society foreseen by the 1876 Regulation on Attorneys was founded on 5 April 1878, when the 63 attorneys in Istanbul met. The first president was Alexandre Meriem Kouli. This is not a detail. The bar's first generation was largely non-Muslim and Levantine jurists, because a Western-style legal education and the practice of commercial law had accumulated in that milieu. In 1908, with the Second Constitutional Era, the first bar roll was drawn up.

1924: the first purge. The "Tefrik Meclisi," the sorting board set up by a provisional article of the Republic's Advocacy Law of 3 April 1924, treated the bar as dissolved, seized its papers, and struck 482 of 960 registered members from the profession. The bar's own history gives these numbers but does not say who was struck off. The overwhelming majority of those removed were non-Muslim lawyers. The "national" character of modern advocacy in Turkey was founded by a purge. Those who say today that "the Republic's law is the reason for the lawyer's existence" need to remember the first application of that sentence. The Republic's law first abolished the existence of half the lawyers.

1938: a public service. The law passed in the Saraçoğlu period defined advocacy as "a profession in the nature of a public service" and tied the bars to the tutelage of the Ministry of Justice. This was the single-party state's idea of a professional organisation: the lawyer is an extension of the state, not of the client, and certainly not of the lawyer-worker.

1960–1980: politicisation. After 27 May the bar board decided that no member would take a defence brief in the trials of the deposed government. That decision was debated for years in the name of the right to defence. The decision of a bar that applauded the coup is an early example of "republican" advocacy becoming identical with the state. The young generation that conducted defences in the martial-law courts after 12 March founded the Contemporary Lawyers group, which still exists. In the 1970s the group was the backbone of the defence in the cases of revolutionaries and trade unionists: the worker here was the client, and the lawyer was not yet the organisation of their own wage. In 1977 the largest participation in the Union of Turkish Bar Associations' refusal to enter hearings came from Istanbul.

12 September. After the coup the bar was closed, its papers were seized, and its officers were questioned. In 1983 the Minister of Justice removed the president, Orhan Apaydın. Apaydın was tried in the Peace Association case and died in 1985. Amendments passed in 1984 narrowed the bars' powers. The class coup we described in our 12 September dossier took the bar as a target too, because in those years the defence was the only institutional channel documenting torture.

The 1990s–2000s: the hegemony of Contemporary Lawyers, and the split. Through the 1990s, under boards from the Contemporary Lawyers tradition, the bar became one of the most visible professional organisations in human rights: the disappeared, torture, F-type prisons, the trials in the Kurdish provinces. The 2001 amendments relatively freed the bars from ministerial tutelage. But in the same years Contemporary Lawyers split. The wing that put the state's "unitary structure" and secularism first broke away as Principle First Contemporary Lawyers and ran the bar without interruption from 2002: Kolcuoğlu, Muammer Aydın, Kocasakal (2010–2016), Durakoğlu (2016–2022), Filiz Saraç (2022–2024). The face of this period is Kocasakal. In the bar's name he opposed the Ergenekon and Balyoz cases sharply and entered personal polemics with Erdoğan; but in 2015 he defended the searching of lawyers at the Çağlayan courthouse by saying "it is not a search, it is a scan." His clash with the state was a clash with one wing of the state.

2020: multiple bars. In June 2020 the bar presidents' "March for the Defence" on Ankara was stopped by a police barricade. The law passed in July opened the way for more than one bar in the large cities, and "Bar No. 2," founded by lawyers close to the government, appeared in Istanbul. The aim was plain: to break the representative power of the opposition bars and their weight in the Union of Turkish Bar Associations.

2024: the coalition. Against this background, in 2024, twenty-two years of Principle First rule fell for the first time. The Lawyers for Change coalition, of groups close to the democratic, socialist, and Kurdish political movements, had Kaboğlu elected by using the split in the nationalist vote. Two years later that split largely closed, and the old balance returned.

The lesson of this history is this. In the Istanbul Bar Association, the rule of the "republican" line is the rule, not the exception. 2024–2026 was the exception. The rule has worked by the state's liquidation of every attempt to make the bar the organisation of the defence rather than of the state: non-Muslims in 1924, Apaydın in 1980, the Kaboğlu board in 2025. An attempt that would make the lawyer-worker the subject of the bar has not yet come to power in this history. The place that will bring it to power is not the bar election. It is the union.

Where Does Nationalism Invest This Anger?

The real knot is not the portrait of an identity. It is where the lawyer-worker's anger went. On election night, what İbrahim Utku Nar wrote on X was widely shared. In short he said this: to call the winners "fascist, chauvinist, an apparatus of the Palace" and pass on is to fail to read the direction of thousands of people. Around the world, nationalist, anti-globalist, "anti-woke" movements are rising in reaction to the damage of globalisation. In Turkey too, since 19 March, there is a new generation of nationalism, different from the secular nationalism of the 2000s: it has taken to the street, it codes the ruling bloc as "Islamism plus traditional nationalism plus ethnic nationalism" and stands against it, it is secular, partly in the line of Nihal Atsız, it shouts Committee of Union and Progress slogans but is also sensitive about Atatürk. It has no concrete programme. It is reactionary. But no discourse can be built without understanding it.

The descriptive part of this observation is largely right, and the research supports it. According to "Turkey's Map of Nationalism", published by the Institute for Social Studies in October 2025, 73.4 per cent of society defines itself as "nationalist" or "very nationalist." Even among CHP voters the rate is 73 per cent. Three of the five most chosen political identities are kinds of nationalism: 34.2 per cent Atatürkist, 25.4 per cent Turkish nationalist, 5.4 per cent ülkücü, the Grey Wolf current. By the same institute's data, those who favour street action to solve problems are 7.6 per cent in the general average and 36 per cent among nationalist students. BBC Turkish's December 2025 field report and the Istanbul Youth Research Centre's April 2025 report draw this generation's portrait. They do not go to the Ülkü Ocakları. They define themselves as "a Turkish nationalist and a Kemalist." Women are as thick on the ground as men. They are distant from religion. They do not attribute as much sacredness to the state as traditional nationalists do. They like the defence industry and Teknofest, but they are opposed to the AKP. They do not deny that Kurds exist, but they count "the process" as treason. They are against migrants and against LGBTI+ people. Eyüphan Erkul's notes from the Maltepe rally in Birikim say the same thing: their families were MHP, then turned to the İYİ Party, then broke from it; they trust neither Bahçeli nor Özdağ; they do not count the grey-wolf sign as fascism; they feel angry, hopeless, and excluded. Begüm Uzun, Cihan Erdal, and Özlem Avcı Aksoy's book Yeni Genç Türkler (New Young Turks), out at the start of 2026, describes the current as "not of one piece, fluid, unorganised."

So yes: to call all of the 10,000 lawyers who voted for Kocasakal "fascists" is not analysis. It is relief. Inside those 10,000 are the cadres of the Principle First tradition that ran the bar for 22 years, the nationalist base of the CHP after Kılıçdaroğlu, the undecided who left the coalition in 2024 because it "put the bar in the dock," and yes, the older members of the 19 March generation who have become lawyers.

The description is right. It is not an explanation. What is missing in Nar's frame is class itself. "The damage globalisation has done" and "the wave that disturbs the comfort of mainstream politics" is the story that every right-wing populism, from Trump to the AfD, from Meloni to Milei, tells about itself: the nation against the global elites. The function of this story is to take the source of the crisis out of property relations and move it to geography, to what is "global," to the outside, to the foreigner. When we wrote on the AfD we tried to show this: what grew the AfD in eastern Germany was not "globalisation" but the dispossession carried out by the Treuhand and the class wound it left. Racism was the wrong ointment rubbed on that wound. It is the same in Turkey.

What Turkey has lived through since 2018 is the collapse of wage labour's share of national income, the turning of the middle class — teachers, engineers, doctors, lawyers — into wage-earners without savings, and the collapse of the young's bridge from education to employment. Every young person the BBC spoke to says they are "economically strained." Şenyuva, of Middle East Technical University, ties the current to "the middle class's economic crisis, nepotism, and anxiety about the future." So everyone sees the source: proletarianisation. The question is why this proletarianisation turned into a national consciousness rather than a class consciousness.

Part of the answer is historical. The left and the trade-union tradition that 12 September liquidated left no class narrative to take their place. For the generations after 1980, "right and left" is a distinction that is unknown or that does not matter. That is Erkul's observation. Part is ideological. For forty years the state has produced nationalism, in the school, the army, and the television, as the only legitimate collective identity. The rate of 73 per cent is the product of that production. And part is political. The ruling bloc competed with the opposition in billing what it took from the worker to the "foreigner" — the Syrian, the Afghan — and to the "terrorist." So the proletarianised youth thinks they have lost not their class but their nation. Hostility to migrants is the purest form of this mechanism: to suppose that what pulls the minimum wage down is the migrant, not the boss who exploits the migrant's unregistered labour. In our piece on racism we called this "the turning of the class contradiction into a race contradiction."

This generation's stand against the government is also read too optimistically. Yes, they oppose the AKP, and on 19 March they clashed with the police. But in the name of what? In the name of "the Republic's gains," "the unitary state," "the first four articles." This is the opposition's reading of the state's founding ideology, set against the reading that is in power. Not attributing "as much sacredness to the state as traditional nationalists do" is not the same thing as questioning the state. This generation questions not the state but the people who govern it. Their position on the Kurdish question shows this plainly. A generation that calls "the process" treason has no concern to repair the greatest division among workers. It is no accident that they like the defence industry and Teknofest. The dream of a strong state and of national technology is, as we described in our piece on techno-fascism, one of the most functional dreams of capitalism in crisis.

This generation's "reactionary foundation" and its "lack of a programme" are not defects. They are structural. Anger without a programme becomes the material of the one who has a programme. The spectrum bidding to collect that material today runs from Perinçek to the CHP's nationalist wing, from the Zafer Party to Principle First. None of them carries the lawyer-worker's programme. The bar election was the rehearsal of this collection. The lawyer-worker's anger went to the ballot not in the name of their own wage, but in the name of "the Republic's law."

The same cover is there in the bringing down of the Kaboğlu board. The prosecution charged this board, under article 76 of the Attorneyship Law, with "going outside the purposes of its foundation." The court acquitted them, but the case for removal went on. For two years the message to the lawyer was this: if the bar makes a political statement, it ends up in court. A part of the electorate turned to the board that "does not bring trouble on our heads." The state failed, by pressure, to detach the professional chambers — TMMOB, the Turkish Medical Association, the bars — from the social opposition. It succeeded through the fear and the fatigue that the pressure produced, and through the voter's choice. Kocasakal will make political statements too, and many of them, but under the headings of "the nation-state" and "secularism." The state is not disturbed by this language. The fight is over who owns the language. The lawyer-worker's language of the wage has been spoken on neither side.

Let Us Set the Positions Side by Side

	Nationalist/republican wing (Kocasakal, Principle First, Vatan Party)	New-generation nationalism (the 19 March generation)	Rights-based democratic wing (the Kaboğlu coalition)	Class position
Source of the crisis	The erosion of the unitary state and of secularism	"Globalisation," nepotism, migrants, "the process"	The liquidation of the rule of law and of rights	Capital's domination over labour, and the crisis of profit
Function of the bar	Guardian of the Republic	(No position particular to the bar; not statist, but a national institution)	Defender of human rights	The organisation of the defence and of the lawyer-worker
The Kurdish question	The unitary structure is not a subject of bargaining	"The process" is treason	Negotiation, rights	The unity of workers; there is no class unity without the equality of peoples
Migrants	Irregular migration is a threat	Open hostility	A rights framework	The migrant worker is a class sibling; the enemy is the boss who employs them off the books
Lawyer-worker, trainee, CMK	Distributive justice (an algorithm)	Not on the agenda	Not on the agenda	The central demand: a trainee's pay, a CMK tariff and payment on time, a collective agreement for the lawyer-worker
Relation to the state	The claim to be the state's real owner	Rejects those who govern, not the state	Limiting the state by law	Seeing the state as a class apparatus, building dual power

What the table says is plain. The first three columns ask the same question — who will govern the state, and with which values — and give different answers. The fourth column changes the question.

What Changes for the Lawyer-Worker?

Let us set the results down starting from the lawyer-worker.

The bar will narrow as a shield of defence, but it will not close. The Kaboğlu board took the institution's side in workplace killings, in the earthquake cases, and in the Saraçhane detentions. Kocasakal says "I will stand against lawlessness no matter whom it is against," and he has a record of clashing with the AKP. It is not impossible to get the bar's symbolic support in workers' cases. But the 2015 defence of the "scan," and the line of "the Republic's law," show that this support will be selective. On Kurdish politicians, journalists, refugees, LGBTI+ people, and questions such as Rojava, the bar's voice will drop. It will rise on secularism and on a "new constitution." For labour organisations this means a separate bargain for every case.

The balance in the Union of Turkish Bar Associations will shift. Istanbul, by its delegates, is the heaviest bar in the union. That the two largest bars, Istanbul and Izmir, have turned the same way strengthens the institutional ground on which a part of the opposition will meet the state on nationalist terrain, in the 2028 union election and in the debate on a new constitution. The danger for class is this: the bond between the workers' fight for rights and the Kurdish question is cut in favour of "the integrity of the state." The trade-union struggle and the struggle for peace are each turned into a separate "security" problem.

The lawyer-worker's organising gap will grow. The salaried lawyer, the unpaid trainee, and the young lawyer who depends on CMK were again unrepresented inside the bar. If the union does not fill this gap, the anger flows into one of the identity columns at the next election.

The anger of the new-generation nationalism has passed into the hands of the nationalist cadres. Anger without a programme is anger that does not yet know whom it is against. That was an opportunity. The bar election showed that one of the first institutional addresses of that anger is "the Republic's law." For the lawyer-worker, the task is to turn the address into their own wage.

Concrete Tasks

Dear comrades, the lawyer-worker organises first. Not in the bar, but in the union. A collective agreement for the salaried lawyer in the large firms, a wage for the trainee, a tariff for CMK and payment within 30 days: the agenda that stayed at 18 per cent in the bar election becomes a power outside the bar and above the bar. The bar does not represent this power. This power presses the bar.

We have to talk with the young new-generation nationalist on class ground. The sentence "you are a fascist" has transformed no one. The sentence "what left you unemployed is not the Syrian, it is the boss who employs the Syrian off the books" can be made every day in a student club, in a trainee's room, in a courthouse corridor. This generation's inclination to take to the street (36 per cent) and its lack of organisation make it possible to win them. It is no accident that, in Şenyuva's focus groups, some say they could vote for the Workers' Party of Turkey. But to win them one has to start from livelihood, not from identity.

We will not hide our position on the Kurdish question. To concede the equality of peoples in order to approach nationalist anger is not to give that anger a class content. It is to adopt its content. The questions we asked in our peace dossier still hold. Until the class answer is given to the question of whom peace will gain what for, the debate on "the process" stays squeezed between two nationalisms.

We will not leave the bar to the rival. We will openly call the new board, every time, to take a side in workplace killings, in workers' cases, and in press-freedom cases. We will test the principle it promised, "no matter whom it is against," on concrete files. As we said in our 24 October piece on journalists, staying silent is the precondition of being silenced.

And we will look at ourselves. Why could the 2024 coalition not grow its base in two years? Because it did not take up the lawyer-worker's agenda. The "rights-based" language did not touch the daily problem of the wage, the traineeship, and the delayed CMK. This is the weakness of the democratic opposition in the bar and in Turkey: defending rights without class, and defending class without rights. The answer we gave to "why can the opposition not win," in our criticism of Evrim Ağacı, was here. It cannot win because it does not speak the language of those who are losing.

Dear Comrades,

Kocasakal won. What really won was the narrative that bills the crisis along the nation-foreigner line. The stamp of "fascism" strengthens that narrative. Saying "let us understand" and withdrawing class surrenders to it. The lawyer-worker's anger has to be claimed by naming what turned them into a wage-earner. The answer to whose law the Republic's law is was given in 1924. Today's question is this: will the defence be the lawyer-worker's defence?

Knowledge belongs to everyone. The organisation is ours.

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