The Class of a Litre of Diesel
For Whom a Hundred Lira Is Cheap, and the Anatomy of Şimşek's European Comparison
For Whom Is a Hundred Lira Cheap? The Anatomy of Şimşek's European Comparison and the Class of a Litre of Diesel
Dear Young Comrades,
Look closely at this sentence:
"In Europe a litre of diesel is not below 150 lira. Here it is around 100 lira. We really did forgo tax."
The Treasury and Finance Minister Mehmet Şimşek said this on 16 September 2026, as the litre of diesel approached three figures for the first time in its history. The next morning, 17 September, the board on Istanbul's European side showed 100.40 lira. The sentence is a defence. It shows one price in order to defend another. And that is exactly why it is worth reading: less for what it shows than for what it does not.
In this piece we will ask three questions:
- Who sets the price of a litre of diesel, and how? In the world and in Turkey.
- What are the real reasons for this month's rises? In figures, item by item.
- For whom is "cheap" cheap? What do we see when we convert the price into the wage, and the wage into hours?
Dear Young Comrades, a minister's comparison is not an arithmetic; it is a frame. If you accept the frame you lose the argument; when "in Europe 150, here 100" is said, answering "no, 130" is to consent to the argument remaining on the pump board. Our work is to bind the board to the wage, the wage to hours of work, and hours of work to property. This piece exists for that.
What Was Said: Taking the Sentence Apart
The fuel section of Minister Şimşek's live-broadcast statement on 16 September consists of four claims (Son Dakika, Turkish Post, Yeni Akit):
- In Europe diesel is not below 150 lira; in Turkey it is around 100 lira.
- The price is not set by crude oil alone; global supply tightness, refinery outages and transport problems also play a part.
- By waiving the specific SCT on diesel ("eşel mobil," the sliding scale) the state met part of the rise from the budget; this means "forgoing a serious amount of public revenue."
- This practice will not continue in 2027; it will run in part until the end of the year.
In the same speech the minister also said that the budget deficit had come in below target (3.1 percent of national income, the target 3.5 percent), that the ratio of tax revenue to national income had risen since 2023 from 20.5 percent to 24.5–25 percent, and that the number of income-tax payers had risen from 3.8 million to 5.5 million. Note these three figures to one side; we will come back to them at the end of the piece. Because right beside the sentence "we forwent tax" stands the sentence "we raised the tax burden by four points," and both come from the same mouth.
There are three things in the sentence to watch.
First, the choice of subject. "In Europe 150, here 100." What is compared is two boards. There are no two people standing in front of the board. Yet a price is not a magnitude on its own; a price is a ratio — the ratio of a thing to the income of the one who is to buy it. That a litre of diesel is 100 lira only takes on meaning with the question "100 lira is how many minutes of whose time?" The minister does not ask this question.
Second, the word "forgoing." To forgo is to give up something you possess. The state says it has a right to take 13.90 lira of SCT from a litre of diesel, and that it is giving that up for a time. This is the presenting of tax as a law of nature. Yet the amount of the specific SCT is set by a Presidential Decision; in 2026 it changed three times. What is at issue is not "forgoing" but a choice, and choices are judged by whose favour they are made in.
Third, the timing. The sentence was said on the day diesel approached 100 lira. While the price was 80 lira no European comparison was being made. The comparison was produced not to manage the rise itself but the reaction to the rise. This is called "expectation management"; in class language we call it the production of consent.
Now let us break the frame and come to the matter itself.
How a Litre of Diesel Is Priced: The World Order
The price of motor fuel is not set in a single place; it forms at the end of a four-layer chain. You cannot read the rises without knowing the layers.
First layer: crude oil
The world consumes about 100 million barrels of crude oil a day. Its price forms less on the physical market than on futures markets: Brent in London, WTI in New York. Brent is the name of a blend of oil from the North Sea, but today it is the reference for a large part of world crude trade. The price of a barrel of Brent is less the price of that day's supply-and-demand balance than the price of the future supply-and-demand expectation. That is why an attack on a tanker can raise the price by three percent without a single physical barrel going missing. Brent passing 100 dollars on 9 September 2026 was exactly this (Tanyeri Haber).
The decisive actor on the supply side of crude is the OPEC+ cartel (the Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries and the partners headed by Russia). The cartel manages the price with production quotas. On the other side, US shale oil is the flexible end of supply. There are also "strategic reserves": the US Strategic Petroleum Reserve made the largest sale in its history in 2022 to bring the price down. That is, the crude price looks like a "market" price, but on both sides of it stand states and cartels.
Second layer: the refinery and the product price
Crude oil is not burned; in the refinery it is separated into petrol, diesel, jet fuel, fuel oil. Each product has its own market and its own price. The gap between diesel and crude is the magnitude called the "crack spread" (the refining margin) and it moves independently of crude. Europe is a net importer of diesel: its own refineries do not cover Europe's diesel need; the gap is imported from the Middle East, India and the United States. That is why a refinery fire in the Middle East makes diesel in Europe dearer faster than petrol. Behind this month's table, in which diesel is 20 lira dearer than petrol, this is what stands; in Europe too diesel (2.03 euros) is dearer than petrol (1.91 euros) (fuel-prices.eu, week of 7 September).
There are references for product prices as well: the daily "CIF Mediterranean" and "CIF North-West Europe" assessments published by the company Platts (S&P Global). Even if a country's refinery produces the product itself, it sets the sale price by this international reference. This is called "import-parity" pricing, and it means this: diesel produced at Tüpraş's refinery in Turkey is priced as if it had been imported from Italy. Domestic production does not mean a domestic price.
Third layer: distribution and retail
The product leaving the refinery passes to the distribution company (depot, haulage, brand, profit) and to the dealer (station, staff, profit). This layer's share varies from country to country between a few cents and a few tens of cents a litre. Who supervises the layer matters; in Turkey EMRA (EPDK) can put a ceiling on distributor and dealer margins, but most of the time it prefers not to.
Fourth layer: tax
In most countries the largest determinant of the pump price is tax. There are two kinds of tax: a fixed specific tax per litre (Energiesteuer in Germany, TICPE in France, SCT in Turkey) and a proportional value-added tax on top of the price (VAT). In Germany about 43 percent of a litre of diesel is tax, in France about 45 percent. The official ground for these taxes being high is road infrastructure and climate policy; the class reality is this: a consumption tax is easier to collect than an income tax, and while it is being collected it is not visible from whom it is taken.
How the world governs this: four models
These four layers of price formation exist in every country; countries are distinguished by how the state intervenes in which layer.
| Model | How it works | Examples | Whom it protects |
|---|---|---|---|
| Free price + high specific tax | The pump price tracks the international product price daily; tax is fixed and high; in a crisis the state makes a temporary cut (Germany 2022 "Tankrabatt," France/Spain 2022 a 20–30 cent rebate per litre) | Most EU countries, Britain | The budget; in a crisis, temporarily, the consumer |
| Free price + low tax | The consumer bears price swings directly; because tax is low the pump price is below the world average | United States | The car-owning consumer; the oil companies |
| Subsidised fixed price | The state fixes the domestic price below the world price and meets the difference from the budget or the national oil company | Gulf states, Iran, Venezuela, Algeria, in part Indonesia–Malaysia | The regime's social base; industrial and transport capital |
| Rule-bound automatic pricing | The formula is announced in advance; the price changes daily/weekly by the formula; the state uses tax "flexibly" to soften the wave (IEPS in Mexico, daily pricing in India after 2017) | India, Mexico, Turkey | Predictability; the consumer to the extent of tax flexibility |
The lesson of this table is plain: in no country does the fuel price "form on the market." In every country the state is inside the price, whether by tax, subsidy, quota or reserve. The question is not whether the state is inside the price, but in whose name it is inside.
How It Works in Turkey: The Domestic Form of the Chain
The 2005 turning point: Law no. 5015 and Tüpraş
In Turkey fuel prices were set by the state until 1 January 2005. With the Petroleum Market Law no. 5015 a "free price" period began; EMRA became the regulator. A year later, in 2006, the country's only refining company, Tüpraş, was privatised and became Koç Holding's. Today the greater part of refining capacity in Turkey is Tüpraş's (İzmit, İzmir, Kırıkkale, Batman); the rest is SOCAR's STAR refinery. That is, "liberalisation" meant two private monopolies taking the place of the state monopoly.
The price formula
In Turkey the pump price forms by this chain (Association of Energy Experts):
- Refinery gate price: Platts CIF Mediterranean product price (dollars/tonne) × CBRT dollar rate ÷ density (0.845 tonnes/m³ for diesel). The refinery is Tüpraş but the price forms in the Mediterranean.
- + SCT: A specific amount per litre; it changes by Presidential Decision.
- + Distributor margin (depot, haulage, brand; there is an EMRA ceiling) + dealer margin (station).
- + VAT: 20 percent; on top of the product, the SCT and the margins. Tax on tax.
The result of this formula is this: in Turkey the pump price tracks the Mediterranean product price and the dollar rate one for one; the only brake in the state's hand is the SCT.
Eşel mobil: the name of the brake
"Eşel mobil" (échelle mobile, "moving staircase"), is the automatic reduction of SCT when the international price or the exchange rate rises, and its automatic increase when they fall. The aim is to hold the pump price still. Turkey applied this in 2018 (the currency crisis), in 2022 (the Ukraine war) and in 2026 (the Strait of Hormuz crisis). By Decision no. 10995 of 5 March 2026, SCT was fixed so as not to exceed the 2 March level (12.53 lira on petrol, 6.12 lira on diesel) and 75 percent of international rises began to be met from SCT (PwC Turkey). SCT on diesel fell to zero in a short time.
Then, on 13 August 2026, by Decision no. 11606, eşel mobil on diesel was removed and a calendar put in its place (Prozon circular, Sözcü):
| Period | Diesel SCT (lira/litre) | Pass-through to the pump, VAT included |
|---|---|---|
| 13–31 August 2026 | 0 | — |
| September 2026 | 3.00 | +3.60 |
| October 2026 | 6.00 | +3.60 |
| November 2026 | 9.00 | +3.60 |
| December 2026 | 12.00 | +3.60 |
| From 1 January 2027 | 13.9006 | +2.28 |
The meaning of this calendar is this: even if the oil price and the exchange rate do not stir at all, diesel will rise from today's 100.40 lira to about 113.5 lira in January 2027. The minister's words "there will be no eşel mobil in 2027" are not news; they are the repetition of a calendar published in the Official Gazette in August. This calculation is ours; it assumes a fixed rate and a fixed product price.
The tax share: past and present
Between 2005 and 2017, 59 to 69 percent of the pump price in Turkey was tax; Turkey was one of the countries that taxed fuel most heavily. Today the table on diesel appears to have turned: of the 100.40-lira price, 3 lira is SCT, 16.73 lira is VAT; the tax share is 19.7 percent. In January 2027 it will rise to 29 percent. In Germany it is 43 percent.
This is what the minister means by "we forwent tax," and that much is true. But the rest of the sentence is not said: if the pump price of a product whose tax is low is this close to that of a country whose tax is high, the pre-tax price is dearer. We will calculate this in the next section.
This Month's Rises: Item by Item
The figures first (EMRA monthly average dealer prices compiled by hakedis.org; daily prices Istanbul European side, Bigpara 1 September, Medyascope 15 September, Sabah 17 September):
| Date | Diesel (lira/L) | Petrol (lira/L) | Note |
|---|---|---|---|
| January 2026 (monthly avg.) | 55.40 | 53.81 | Before eşel mobil |
| August 2026 (monthly avg.) | 79.77 | 70.69 | SCT on diesel zero |
| 1 September 2026 | 81.07 | 74.34 | SCT +3 lira (to the pump +3.60) |
| 15 September 2026 | 95.60 | 80.26 | Diesel +6.62 lira |
| 17 September 2026 | 100.40 | 80.26 | Diesel +4.68 lira; three figures for the first time |
In seventeen days diesel rose 19.33 lira, 23.8 percent. Against the January average the rise is 81 percent. In the same period annual consumer inflation was 31.51 percent (TÜİK, August 2026). That is, diesel became dearer more than two and a half times as fast as official inflation.
Now let us separate the reasons. There are four items; all four worked at once and in the same direction.
Hormuz: the crude shock
Since the beginning of September the military tension between the United States and Iran has moved to the Strait of Hormuz. US Central Command announced that it had struck three Iranian tankers; the Iranian Revolutionary Guard announced that it had targeted US ships and commercial tankers; the Houthis attacked Saudi Aramco's East–West pipeline to Yanbu. A fifth of the world's oil passes through this strait; according to Kpler data daily transit fell to ten ships (BirGün, Son Haber). Brent was 91.13 dollars on 1 September (En Son Dakika); on 9 September it passed 100; on 10 September it saw 109.68; on 17 September 104.59 (Haber Kıbrıs). Fifteen percent in seventeen days. OPEC+ did not change its production policy at its meeting.
Let us underline once more: there is not yet a large cut in physical supply. What is raising the price is the futures market's risk premium. That is, a significant part of the difference you paid at the pump this month is the pricing, today, of a shortage that has not yet taken place.
The diesel margin: the refinery layer
The Middle East is Europe's diesel supplier. The narrowing of the strait hit diesel harder than crude. In Germany diesel rose to 2.38 euros on 14 September; it approached April's peak of the year (2.446); ING's chief economist said that if oil stayed above 110 dollars diesel would "dangerously approach" 3 euros. In Turkey the diesel–petrol gap opened to 20 lira for this reason: while petrol has stood still since 15 September, diesel took two rises.
The SCT calendar: the state's layer
On 1 September 3 lira of SCT came onto diesel; with VAT it passed through to the pump as 3.60 lira. This is about a fifth of the 19.33-lira rise in seventeen days. The remaining 15.7 lira came from the product price, the exchange rate and the margins. In October there is another 3.60.
The exchange rate: the quiet item
The dollar was 48.67 lira on 17 September (Dünya). The rate looks calm this month; but against a year ago it is about 18 percent up. The exchange rate's effect on fuel does not come in a day; it comes every week, at every refinery price update, drop by drop. That is why we call it the "quiet item."
The total
| Item | Contribution (approx.) | Who decides |
|---|---|---|
| Crude (Brent +15 percent) | Large share | US–Iran military tension; OPEC+; the futures market |
| Diesel margin (crack spread) | Medium share | Refinery capacity, Middle East exports |
| SCT (+3 lira → +3.60) | ~19 percent | Presidential Decision (13 August) |
| Exchange rate | Small but continuous | CBRT policy; capital movements |
| Distributor/dealer margin | Fixed, but VAT-bearing on a high price | EMRA (prefers not to supervise) |
A class reading: In none of these five items is waged labour a party. The states that decide on war, the cartel that sets the quota, the Palace that sets the tax, the holding that sets the margin. But the bill of all five items goes to a single address: we will see it in the next section.
Is "In Europe 150" True? Measuring the Board by the Board
Let us first test the minister's comparison on its own ground, the ground of the board. Data for the week of 7 September, based on the European Commission's weekly oil bulletin, are as follows (fuel-prices.eu; euros/litre; lira equivalent at the 17 September rate, 1 euro = 55.91 lira; the calculation is ours):
| Country | Diesel (€/L) | Lira equivalent | Against Turkey |
|---|---|---|---|
| Finland | 2.478 | 138.5 | +38 percent |
| Netherlands | 2.442 | 136.5 | +36 percent |
| Denmark | 2.435 | 136.1 | +36 percent |
| Germany | 2.328 | 130.2 | +30 percent |
| France | 2.257 | 126.2 | +26 percent |
| Italy | 2.142 | 119.8 | +19 percent |
| Greece | 2.054 | 114.8 | +14 percent |
| EU average | 2.030 | 113.5 | +13 percent |
| Poland | 1.982 | 110.8 | +10 percent |
| Romania | 1.942 | 108.6 | +8 percent |
| Bulgaria | 1.816 | 101.5 | +1 percent |
| Spain | 1.795 | 100.4 | 0 |
| Turkey (17 September) | 1.796 | 100.40 | — |
Result: as of the week of 7 September, in no EU member was diesel above 150 lira. The dearest country, Finland, 138.5 lira; the EU average 113.5 lira; Spain the same as Turkey; Bulgaria one lira dearer. Since that week prices in Europe have risen a further 3–5 percent; Germany rose to 2.38 euros (133 lira) on 14 September. Still below 150. The minister's figure exceeds even the dearest European country by 8 percent; it exceeds the EU average by 32 percent.
This is a correction made on the ground of the board, and on its own it is not important. What matters is the next step: what remains when you take the tax out?
The pre-tax price: the real indicator
The minister ties Turkey's cheapness to the waiving of tax. So let us take the tax out of both sides (the calculation is ours; for Germany energy tax 47.04 cents + the 2026 CO₂ price about 16 cents + 19 percent VAT; for Spain hydrocarbon tax 37.9 cents + 21 percent VAT; for France TICPE about 61 cents + 20 percent VAT; for Turkey 3 lira SCT + 20 percent VAT):
| Country | Pump (€/L) | Taxes (€/L) | Pre-tax price (€/L) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Germany | 2.328 | ~1.00 | ~1.33 |
| France | 2.257 | ~0.99 | ~1.27 |
| Spain | 1.795 | ~0.69 | ~1.10 |
| Turkey | 1.796 | ~0.35 | ~1.44 |
The pre-tax price of a litre of diesel in Turkey is 8 percent dearer than in Germany, 13 percent dearer than in France, 30 percent dearer than in Spain. The board the minister calls "cheap" is a dearer product masked by the state's forgoing of tax. When the tax returns (January 2027) the mask will fall and Turkey will pass the EU average on the diesel price.
Why is the pre-tax price this high? There are three candidates: freight and insurance added to the Mediterranean product price; refinery and distributor margins; and the pass-through of the exchange rate into the product price. Which weighs most EMRA ought to disclose; it does not. The absence of the data is also a datum.
The Real Comparison: Converting the Board into the Wage
Now we come to the question the minister did not ask. A litre of diesel is how many minutes of the person who is to buy it?
In Turkey the 2026 net minimum wage is 28,075.50 lira; gross 33,030 lira (Ministry of Labour). There was no mid-year rise. For European minimum wages we use Eurostat's January 2026 data (gross, monthly, euros) (Eurostat). Turkey's gross minimum wage at the 17 September rate is 591 euros.
How many litres of diesel does a month's minimum wage buy?
Gross wages were divided by that country's diesel price (the calculation is ours):
| Country | Gross minimum wage (€/month) | Diesel (€/L) | Litres |
|---|---|---|---|
| Germany | 2,343 | 2.328 | 1,006 |
| Netherlands | 2,295 | 2.442 | 940 |
| France | 1,823 | 2.257 | 808 |
| Spain | 1,381 | 1.795 | 769 |
| Poland | 1,139 | 1.982 | 575 |
| Greece | 1,027 | 2.054 | 500 |
| Romania | 795 | 1.942 | 409 |
| Bulgaria | 620 | 1.816 | 341 |
| Turkey | 591 | 1.796 | 329 |
Turkey's minimum wage in euros is below the EU's lowest minimum wage (Bulgaria); the diesel price is the same as Bulgaria's. Result: the minimum-wage earner in Turkey buys less diesel than the minimum-wage earner in the EU's poorest member. Three times less than the German minimum-wage earner, two and a half times less than the French, twice less than the Spanish. If you calculate on the net (28,075.50 ÷ 100.40) the figure is 280 litres.
How many minutes of labour is a litre of diesel?
On 225 hours a month the net hourly minimum wage in Turkey is 124.8 lira. A litre of diesel equals 48 minutes of work, a litre of petrol 39 minutes. In Germany the hourly gross minimum wage is 13.90 euros; a litre of diesel 10 minutes. In France 12.31 euros; 11 minutes. In Bulgaria about 3.6 euros; 30 minutes (the calculations are ours).
A minimum-wage earner in Turkey works five times as long as their German class sibling, one and a half times as long as their Bulgarian class sibling, for a litre of diesel.
Where the minister says "here 100, in Europe 150," this is the real ratio: 48 minutes against 10 minutes. When you convert the price into minutes, Turkey becomes Europe's dearest country.
Where purchasing power went: the story of 2026
Here let us be honest at one point. The objection from the opposition that "in 2013 petrol was 5 lira, purchasing power was higher" (Karar) does not hold when tested against the figures: in 2013 the net minimum wage was between 773 and 804 lira; with 5-lira petrol 155–161 litres were bought; today 350 litres are bought. There is no thirteen-year decline on the litre count. We do not use a figure because we like it; we use it because it is true.
The decline is elsewhere, and much closer. When we divide the net minimum wage by EMRA's monthly average diesel price (the calculation is ours):
| Period | Net minimum wage (lira) | Diesel (lira/L) | Litres |
|---|---|---|---|
| June 2023 | 8,506.80 | 22.11 | 385 |
| July 2023 | 11,402.32 | 29.49 | 387 |
| January 2024 | 17,002.12 | 39.45 | 431 |
| January 2025 | 22,104.67 | 46.29 | 477 |
| January 2026 | 28,075.50 | 55.40 | 507 |
| August 2026 | 28,075.50 | 79.77 | 352 |
| 17 September 2026 | 28,075.50 | 100.40 | 280 |
In January 2026 a minimum wage bought 507 litres of diesel; today 280 litres. A 45 percent loss in eight and a half months. The mechanism of this loss is simple: the wage is set once a year and stays fixed for twelve months; the price changes every week. There was no interim rise; there was not even a statement from the government on the matter (Bigpara). When diesel reaches 113 lira by January 2027 on the SCT calendar the litre count will fall to 248; if the January rise is 20 percent it will go to 297; that is, the "rise" to be made at the new year will not even restore 60 percent of the purchasing power of a year before.
This is exactly what is invisible in the minister's comparison. When he said "100 lira" on 16 September he did not say that that 100 lira was heavier than January's 55 lira; because the unit that measures the weight is the wage, and the wage is not in the minister's sentence.
Comparison with the TÜRK-İŞ line
According to TÜRK-İŞ's August 2026 calculation the hunger line for a family of four is 37,388.30 lira, the poverty line 121,786 lira, the living cost of a single worker 48,305.38 lira (TÜRK-İŞ). The net minimum wage is 75 percent of the hunger line. There is already no one buying fuel on this wage; the minimum-wage earner pays for diesel not at the pump but in bread, in tomatoes, in the works-bus fare, in the parcel. That is why the next section leaves the pump and enters the kitchen.
Effect on Our Lives: Where Does Diesel Leak?
Diesel is by a long way the largest item of motor fuel consumed in Turkey, and the greater part of it is burned not in private cars but in lorries, buses, tractors, construction plant, generators. That is why a diesel rise is not a "drivers' problem"; it is the price of the price of everything. Let us list the paths of leakage.
1. Food. Every kilometre between the field and the supermarket is covered in diesel. The tractor's tank, the cold-chain lorry, wholesale-market haulage, supermarket distribution. A 20.63-lira rise against the August average means 8,252 lira on every fill of a 400-litre lorry tank (the calculation is ours). The haulier writes this into the freight charge, the wholesaler into the price, the supermarket onto the label. TÜRK-İŞ's kitchen inflation is 37.9 percent in twelve months; diesel rose twice as fast and has not yet fully passed through to the kitchen.
2. Public transport and the works bus. Municipal buses, minibuses, workers' services run on diesel. The works-bus fare appears in the employer's "fringe benefit" item; it is the first item cut. A minibus rise comes onto the municipal tariff; the tariff always rises after the fuel rise and by less than the rise; the driver's labour closes the gap.
3. The owner-operator courier, the taxi, the haulage worker. The "owner-operator courier" we described in the Gig Economy Dossier is the worker who puts the fuel in from their own pocket. Their motorcycle runs on petrol; petrol has risen 13.5 percent since August, the piece-rate has not. For the lorry driver diesel rose 26 percent; freight rates will rise later and by less. The difference comes out of the driver's income.
4. Agriculture. The farmer buys diesel at the world price and sells the crop at the wholesale-market price. "Diesel support" is paid per decare and lags behind the rise. The result is either a field left unplanted or dearer food.
5. Electricity and heating. Natural-gas and electricity prices are indirectly linked to oil; energy rises before winter are the second wave of this shock.
6. The inflation–wage gap. Diesel is a small item directly in the CPI basket; but through haulage it enters every item. This month's rise will work into October–November inflation; the December minimum-wage bargaining will be done on "past inflation." That is, the worker pays this rise once at the pump, once at the supermarket, and once in a delayed wage increase.
7. The collapse of the small property-holder. The haulier who works with their own lorry, the driver who works with their own taxi, the peasant who produces with their own tractor: these are not "employers" but labourers who own a means of production. A fuel rise eats not their profit margin but their wages. This layer stands on the threshold of proletarianisation, and every fuel shock brings the threshold a step closer.
A Class Reading: Who Cuts the Bill, Who Pays It?
Specific tax, hidden rate
SCT is taken as a fixed amount per litre: the same 13.90 lira on the minimum-wage earner's car and on the holding manager's car. A fixed tax, when set against income, becomes regressive: those with low income give a larger percentage of their income. About two thirds of Turkey's total tax revenue comes from this kind of indirect tax. The minister's boast that "income-tax payers rose from 3.8 million to 5.5 million" is the confession of a load spread onto the base; the taxation of capital gains is not discussed.
Whom did the "forgoing" serve?
The minister announced the budget cost of zeroing SCT on diesel in the spring as "90 billion lira in two months"; the Revenue Administration put it above 100 billion; the tax specialist Ozan Bingöl's calculation, subtracting the extra VAT brought by the rising price, brought it back to 90 billion (Sözcü). Let us leave the figure and ask the question: who benefited from this money? The large consumers of diesel are commercial vehicle fleets, logistics companies, construction and farm capital. While tax was zeroed the product's pre-tax price stayed above Europe's; that is, the tax forgone was partly absorbed in the upper links of the chain before it fully reached the consumer. The state took no tax, the refinery and the distributor kept their margin, the lorry owner got "cheap diesel" but did not cut the freight rate. The forgoing had melted before it reached the worker at the end of the chain.
The refining monopoly
Tüpraş is Turkey's largest industrial company and it belongs to a single holding. The refining margin (the gap between crude and product) widened in the Hormuz crisis. Crisis periods are profit periods for refineries; it was so in 2022 as well. No one is asking "what did Tüpraş make from this crisis"; EMRA is not using its power to supervise margins. The sentence "the price forms in the Mediterranean" presents the domestic monopoly's profit as an international law of nature.
The bill of the war
The tension in Hormuz is an oil crisis, but before that it is an imperialist conflict. Neither the rulers in Washington nor those in Tehran are paying the cost of the US–Iran confrontation; nor is the minister in Ankara. The bill is paid by a Bursa textile worker of whom it is not expected that they should show on a map where Hormuz is; when the works-bus fare is cut. As we wrote in Open Questions on the Peace Process: war is the cost classes share most unequally.
The wage regime
This is the real mechanism: prices are set weekly, wages yearly. This is not a technical detail; it is a class arrangement. Every month of inflation, every month the wage stays fixed, is a transfer from waged labour to capital. Eşel mobil was built for the fuel price; there is no eşel mobil for the wage. Yet the concept of the "moving staircase" was invented in history precisely for this, for the automatic indexation of wages to inflation; in Italy the scala mobile was from 1945 to 1992 the working class's most important gain, and capital spent forty years trying to take it down. In Turkey the concept was taken from the wage and given to tax.
The official narrative and the class reading
| Official narrative | Class reading |
|---|---|
| "In Europe 150, here 100." | In no EU country is it 150; the EU average is 113. The pre-tax price in Turkey is dearer than in Germany. |
| "We forwent tax." | Tax is a Presidential Decision; not forgoing but a choice. The share forgone melted in the chain; it did not fully reach the worker. |
| "Tax revenues rose to 25 percent of national income." | The load was spread onto the base: indirect tax and income tax taken from the wage-earner. Capital gains are not discussed. |
| "The price forms on the market." | The price is the Mediterranean reference + monopoly margin + a Palace decision; what you call the market is four actors. |
| "A global crisis, not in our hands." | The crisis is global, the wage policy is domestic: no interim rise was made, not even a statement. |
| "There will be no eşel mobil in 2027." | A calendar signed in August: 113 lira in January, even if oil does not stir. |
| "We support diesel for transport, agriculture, industry." | The support goes to the sector; freight and food prices do not fall; the worker pays both at the pump and at the supermarket. |
What Is Being Covered Over?
Let us list not what the comparison shows but what it does not.
The wage. It is not in the sentence. The absence of the wage in a price comparison objectifies the price by detaching it from income; once it is an object the only thing to be argued is "how many lira."
The pre-tax price. While the state says "I waived tax," it is not said that the pre-tax price is above Europe's. Because that would bring Tüpraş, the distributors and EMRA onto the agenda.
The calendar. The sentence "there will be no eşel mobil in 2027" presents a decision published in August as a new statement; the October, November, December rises are not said.
The war. The military tension raising the price is referred to as "global uncertainty." Who is fighting whom and why, and where Turkey stands in these blocs, is not discussed.
Profit. The refining margin, distributor profit, crisis-period gains do not pass in a single word.
The timing. The same week, with the liquidation of 130 funds on the exchange, the small investor's money was locked and collateral ease was granted to the leveraged large player (Circuit Breaker: The Bourgeoisie's Exchange Does Not Even Trust Itself). The same week diesel became 100 lira. The same week not a single sentence was said on an interim rise in the minimum wage. These three are not independent pieces of news; they are three articles of the same programme: the cost of the programme called "disinflation" is written onto the wage, its gain stays with capital. The minister said this plainly in the same speech: "Disinflation requires a slowdown in growth in the short term." The first item a slowing growth cuts is employment and the wage; the broad-definition unemployment figures we showed in TÜİK: Two Figures, One Country: 8.1% and 30.6% are the proof of this.
To Young Comrades: How to Read a Price
Comrade, if a single thing is to remain from this piece, let it be this: a price, on its own, says nothing. To read a price you must convert it three times.
First convert it into the wage. Not "how many lira" but "how many hours." 100 lira is 48 minutes. This conversion makes visible who pays the price.
Then convert it into tax. How much of the price goes to the state, how much to the producer, how much to the intermediary? This conversion makes visible where the price forms. On diesel today 20 percent goes to the state, 80 percent to the chain; at the top of the chain there is a single refinery.
Then convert it into time. How many hours was this price a year ago, how many hours will it be a year from now? This conversion makes the mechanism visible: a yearly wage, a weekly price.
When you have made the three conversions the minister's sentence takes this form: "In Europe a worker works 10 minutes for a litre of diesel, here 48 minutes. We pretended to close part of the gap by waiving tax; but our pre-tax price is dearer than Europe's as well. In January we will put the tax back; we have frozen the wage until January." The subject of this sentence is you. The minister did not say it; you will.
And do not forget this: neither of the two sides offered to you in this argument sees class. The government shows the board; the opposition says "it was better in 2013." Both stand on the same ground, the ground of "price"; one's figure is wrong, the other's figure is wrong as well. The right ground is the wage, property, who decides. No one but you will come onto that ground.
Concrete Tasks
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Make converting the price into hours a habit. Rewrite every rise story as "how many minutes"; put the wage beside every figure you share. Do not join the argument over the board.
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Put the works bus and travel money on the agenda at the workplace. The first place a diesel rise hits the worker is the works bus. In the collective agreement or through the workplace representative, ask that the travel allowance be indexed to the fuel price.
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Demand eşel mobil for the wage. The automatic indexation of the minimum wage and of all wages to inflation every six months is not a technical demand; it is a class demand. Have it written into your union's draft collective agreement.
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Stand beside the owner-operator courier and the lorry driver. The worker who puts the fuel in from their pocket is the first victim of this rise. Count the fuel demand of the courier association and the hauliers' cooperative as your own demand.
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Put a question to EMRA. By a freedom-of-information request, ask how far diesel's pre-tax price diverges from the Mediterranean reference, and what the distributor margin is. If no answer comes, write the not-coming.
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Watch Tüpraş's crisis-period profit. Quarterly financial statements are published on KAP. When the refining margin widens, show with figures who gained.
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Watch the municipal council. On public-transport rises, ask about the municipality's diesel tender and the driver's wage; ask how many lira of the rise is fuel and how many is labour.
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Take the tax argument out of indirect tax. Answer the sentence "we forwent tax" with the question "how much did you take from capital gains?" Prepare a page on wealth tax, corporation-tax exemptions and the ratio of VAT to income, and distribute it at the workplace.
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Do not let the war drop from the agenda. Every tanker attack in Hormuz is your works-bus fare. The demand for peace is an economic demand; tell it that way.
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Keep your own table. Update the litre table in this piece every month: net minimum wage ÷ that month's EMRA average. When the minimum-wage commission meets in December, have a twelve-month series in your hand. Let the figure be yours, not the minister's.
Dear Young Comrades,
The minister put two boards side by side and said "we are cheap." We put two people side by side: one works ten minutes, the other forty-eight minutes, for the same litre. The difference between the boards is an exchange-rate matter; the difference between the people is a class matter.
A price is neither cheap nor dear for as long as it is not measured by the hours of the one who is to pay it. It is only whose saying it is.
Comradely.
Knowledge belongs to everyone.
Related Pieces
For our economy and class line: bilgimusterekleri.org/en/tag/ekonomi
The other face of the same week
Wages, poverty, unemployment
- The Bell Does Not Ring the Same for Everyone
- TÜİK: Two Figures, One Country: 8.1% and 30.6%
- Gig Economy Dossier
- Sandalyeyi Kim Kaldırdı?
War and peace
Sources
- Şimşek's statement: Son Dakika, 16 September 2026; Turkish Post; Yeni Akit; Manisa Haberleri
- Reactions: Karar (Selçuk Türkoğlu); Fatih Altaylı; TR724
- Fuel prices: Bigpara, 1 September 2026; Medyascope, 15 September 2026; Sabah, 17 September 2026; EMRA monthly average dealer prices (hakedis.org compilation); Medyascope, 16 January 2025
- SCT and eşel mobil: PwC Turkey, Decision no. 10995; Prozon, Decision no. 11606; Sözcü, the stepped SCT calendar; Ozan Bingöl, Sözcü
- Price formation: Association of Energy Experts
- The oil market and Hormuz: BirGün; Tanyeri Haber; Haber Kıbrıs; En Son Dakika
- European prices: fuel-prices.eu (compilation of the EU Weekly Oil Bulletin), week of 7 September 2026; Son Haber, Germany/ADAC
- Wages: Ministry of Labour 2026 minimum wage; Eurostat, January 2026 minimum wages; TÜRK-İŞ August 2026; Bigpara, interim rise
- Exchange rate: Dünya, 17 September 2026
Calculated ratios (litres, minutes, pre-tax prices, lira equivalents) are ours; the raw data they rest on are linked above. European prices belong to the week of 7 September, the Turkish price to 17 September; in the days between, prices in Europe rose 3–5 percent and this difference does not change the results.
