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Why Do We Deceive Ourselves?

From Delphi to the Algorithm: False Correlations, Groundless Judgements, and the Class of Reason

55 min readAuthor: Oğuz Demirkapı
Why Do We Deceive Ourselves?

A reference text for young comrades ahead of the meeting "Why Do We Deceive Ourselves? False Correlations and Groundless Judgements", which MARFET will hold at 18:00 on Friday, 30 October 2026, at Daima Cafe&Bar (İçmeler, Marmaris).

Dear young comrades,

The Marmaris Philosophy Community has chosen a difficult question this week: why do we deceive ourselves? The question is difficult, because the one who deceives and the one who is deceived are the same person. When you meet a swindler, there is at least someone opposite you; when you deceive yourself, there is no one opposite you, only a face in the mirror saying to you "you are right".

The question is not new, either. Humanity has been asking it for at least twenty-five centuries, and every age answers it with its own material: an oracle at Delphi, a maternity ward in Vienna, a café in Paris, a space shuttle in Florida. In this essay I shall first take up the mechanism of the question today: the gulf between correlation and causality, the mind's shortcuts, and the false correlations that build our everyday judgements. Then I shall follow the same question from inside the history of philosophy; not like a visit to a museum, but like an inquiry, because the answer each age gives shows the next age's lack. After that I shall tell what Marxist analysis has added to this accumulation, and what the age of the algorithm has changed. At the end there is a three-layered synthesis, discussion questions for tomorrow evening's table, and concrete tasks.

First the summary, then the detail. What we have written earlier on this blog, on The Weight of a Decision: Kierkegaard on Choice and Responsibility, From Having to Being: Reading Erich Fromm with Class and Telling Young Comrades about Ioanna Kuçuradi, are kin to this essay.


Summary: Twelve Theses

  1. Self-deception is not a malfunction; it is a by-product of the ordinary way reason works. In order to decide quickly under uncertainty, the mind looks for a pattern, fills in the gaps, and uses shortcuts. These shortcuts work most of the time; and because they bring a benefit, we do not notice that we are in error.

  2. The core of "false correlation" is to take two things seen together as each other's cause. When ice-cream sales rise, drownings rise; the cause is not the ice cream, it is the summer. This simple example is the pattern of most of our political judgements.

  3. False correlation is innocent on its own; what makes it dangerous is whose interest it serves. The judgement "the poor are poor because they are lazy" is a correlation empty as statistics but very full socially: it justifies the order of property.

  4. The mind seeks the evidence that confirms what it believes, and does not see what refutes it. But confirmation bias does not operate in a vacuum; what we want to believe is determined, in great part, by our class position and by the "common sense" set before us.

  5. Philosophy has been asking this question for twenty-five centuries, and each age saw one layer of it. Socrates described ignorance, Aristotle the knowing and not doing, Plato the collective chain, the Stoics judgement, al-Ghazali imitation, Ibn Khaldun the historian's interest, Bacon the idols, Pascal diversion, La Rochefoucauld self-love, Hume the habit of causality, Kant the lack of courage, Nietzsche pride, Freud defence, Sartre bad faith, Arendt thoughtlessness.

  6. Every age of history has exemplified these concepts with events. Croesus's oracle, the Sicilian Expedition, Salem, the tulip and share bubbles, Semmelweis's maternity ward, Lysenko, Vietnam, Challenger, the tobacco industry's note that "doubt is our product", Greenspan's confession "I have found a flaw in my model".

  7. The most persistent of groundless judgements is the belief that "the world is just". People are inclined to believe that someone who undergoes something bad must have deserved it; because the contrary means accepting that they themselves are unprotected too. This belief is the oldest screen that makes exploitation invisible.

  8. What Marx called "ideology" is not the sum of individual errors; it is social relations showing themselves in inverted form. The wage appears as "the price of labour", whereas it is the price of labour-power; profit appears as "the yield of capital", whereas it is unpaid labour. If appearance and essence coincided, in Marx's phrase, there would be no need of science.

  9. Engels's phrase "false consciousness" is not an accusation of stupidity. Ideology is a process which the thinking person conducts consciously, but without awareness of his own real motives. We can be honest while we deceive ourselves; the matter is not intention, but where our point of view stands.

  10. The age of the algorithm has industrialised the production of false correlation. Recommendation systems, advertising models and large language models work by correlation without asking causality, and the owners of these machines decide what we shall see. The tobacco industry sold doubt as a product; the platforms are selling confirmation as a product.

  11. Self-deception has three layers: mind, existence, society. The first two explain the possibility of error and its motive; the third, its direction. The mind can err in every direction; if it insistently errs in the same direction, there is a force pushing it in that direction.

  12. The antidote is not a virtue for one person alone; it is an organised method, and a practice that intervenes in the world. Science is a system that accepts that the individual cannot see his own prejudice, and distributes the check to others. The same principle holds for politics: there is no person who thinks correctly alone; there are communities that learn to think together. And which correlation is real, we learn from the resistance the world gives us when we set about changing the world.


Part One: The Mechanics of Error

1. Let us set three concepts in place: correlation, causality, judgement

Correlation is the tendency of two things to change together. If, while one increases, the other also increases, there is a positive correlation; if, while one increases, the other decreases, there is a negative correlation. Correlation is an observation; it does not say anything, it only says "these two are moving together".

Causality is one of them giving rise to the other. To pass from correlation to causality, three questions are asked. Is the direction right (is it A that makes B, or B that makes A)? Is a third factor moving both at once (a hidden variable)? Or is it only chance?

Judgement is to take a correlation, or an observation, and say "such and such is so". Judgement is unavoidable; one cannot live without judgement. A "groundless judgement" is one whose correlation has not passed these three questions. Philosophy teaches not escape from judgement, but the asking of the ground of judgement.

The classic example: in the summer months ice-cream sales rise, and in the same months deaths by drowning also rise. Does the ice cream drown people? No; in hot weather people both eat ice cream and go into the sea. Temperature is the hidden factor that moves both variables at once. This example may seem childish; but in a moment we shall see that an important part of the judgements on the economics pages and in the public squares is exactly of this pattern.

2. The mind's shortcuts

In the second half of the twentieth century, psychology drew a map of the shortcuts the mind uses. The work of Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky is the backbone of this field; Kahneman's book of 2011, Thinking, Fast and Slow, is the popular summary of them. (A note: a portion of the experiments recounted in the book, especially those to do with the "priming" effect, could not be repeated in later years; Kahneman accepted this openly in 2017. This is a fine example of the field applying its own method to itself. What I shall list below are findings that have been repeated many times.)

Confirmation bias. In 1960 Peter Wason gave subjects the sequence "2-4-6" and asked them to find the rule. The subjects tried sequences that confirmed their own assumptions (8-10-12), and did not try sequences that would refute them (1-2-3). The rule was only "increasing numbers"; most did not find it. Instead of testing what we believe, we have it confirmed.

The tendency to see a pattern (apophenia). We see a face in the clouds, a voice in the noise, a plan in chance. Because, in evolutionary terms, to err by taking the rustle in the bush for the wind is more costly than to err by taking it for a tiger. A false alarm is cheap; a missed threat is deadly. This asymmetry sets the mind to see correlation.

After this, therefore because of this (post hoc ergo propter hoc). A new manager arrived, sales fell; so it is down to the manager. Perhaps the market contracted that year.

Survivorship bias. In the Second World War it was proposed to the statistician Abraham Wald that the places where the bullet holes clustered on the aircraft that returned should be armoured. Wald said the reverse: armour the places where there are no holes; those struck there did not come back. This is the statistical value of the narrative "I started from nothing, I worked, I became rich": those who did the same thing and are not there do not speak.

The availability heuristic. We take what comes easily to mind to be probable. If we see street crime in the news every day, we think that street crime has increased; if workplace killings do not enter the news, we take them to be rare. Yet, as we wrote in September on the Human Rights Association's (İHD) 2025 report, more than three-quarters of deaths by violence in Turkey take place in workplaces. Availability depends on what the media makes available; and that is a question of property.

Base-rate neglect. If a test for an illness is 99 per cent correct, and the illness is seen in one in ten thousand, the probability that a positive test is truly a case of illness is below one per cent. Debates on immigrant criminality proceed by exactly this error: a few striking cases erase a base rate of millions of people.

Simpson's paradox. In 1973, in applications to the University of California, Berkeley, the admission rate of men was higher than that of women; a charge of discrimination was made. Looked at department by department, it was seen that in most departments women were admitted at an equal or a higher rate; women had applied more to crowded departments with a low rate of admission. The data did not remove the problem; they moved its place: why were women turning to those departments?

The fundamental attribution error. We tie someone else's behaviour to his personality, and our own behaviour to the circumstances. He was late because he is irresponsible; I was late because there was traffic. On the social scale this becomes "the poor are lazy, the rich are hard-working". In a moment we shall see: this is not a random error.

3. A display of false correlations

In 2014 a law student named Tyler Vigen set up a site that set publicly available data sets against one another; the following year the book Spurious Correlations came out. Over a ten-year period there is a correlation of 0.67 between the number of films Nicolas Cage appeared in during a year and the number of people who drowned in swimming pools in the United States. If you compare enough variables with enough variables, you will find strong correlations by pure chance; this is called "p-value hunting", and it is one of the main causes of the replicability crisis in science. An older example: there is a significant correlation between the number of stork pairs and the number of births in European countries (Robert Matthews, 2000). The stork does not bring the baby; in large countries both more storks and more people live.

Let us now turn these into the everyday judgements of Turkey.

"When the minimum wage rises, inflation rises." The rise in the minimum wage and inflation rise together; that is true. But what is the direction? The minimum wage is set according to past inflation; inflation chases the wage, not the reverse. Moreover there are hidden variables that move both at once: the exchange rate, energy prices, profit margins. In September Inflation, the TÜİK-ENAG Gap we had explained that the thermometer itself can also be a class instrument. The false correlation here is not an error of calculation; it is the justification for pressing the wage down.

"The migrants came, and rents rose." The number of migrants and rents rose in the same years. But in the same years the production of housing fell, interest-rate policy changed, housing turned into an instrument of investment, and construction capital held stock. The migrant is the most visible and the most defenceless variable; the rentier is invisible. Capitalism's Rent Is Taking Its Revenge had taken up this hidden variable. Base-rate neglect, availability and the fundamental attribution error unite here in a single judgement: accuse the weak, and do not see the strong.

"Those who work, earn." A portion of the people who work a great deal are rich; therefore work makes one rich. Yet the people in the world who work the most are in the fields, in the mines, in the couriers' delivery boxes and on the factory belts. The Soma miners of A Class Seven Layers Underground work ten hours a day, seven layers underground. What is at work is survivorship bias: the one who worked and became rich speaks; the one who worked and died cannot speak.


Part Two: Seven Stops in the History of Philosophy

4. Ancient Greece: Not knowing, or knowing and not doing?

An oracle at Delphi. In the first book of the Histories, Herodotus tells the story of Croesus, king of Lydia. Before attacking Cyrus, king of the Persians, Croesus consults Delphi. The oracle is this: "If you cross the Halys, you will destroy a great empire." Croesus reads this as tidings of victory, crosses the river, and the great empire that is destroyed is his own. This is the first recorded case of confirmation bias: an ambiguous sign is filled with the meaning we want to believe. The oracle had not lied; Croesus had said it to himself.

Socrates: no one does evil knowingly. In Plato's Protagoras, Socrates maintains that everyone who does wrong in fact does not know. On this view, self-deception is a kind of ignorance, and its remedy is knowledge. The saying "I know that I do not know" and the inscription "know thyself" on the door of the temple at Delphi are parts of the same programme.

Aristotle: knowing, and not doing. In the seventh book of the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle objects: people do what is wrong even while they know what is right; he calls this akrasia. In akrasia there is knowledge, but at that moment it is as if "asleep"; passion temporarily silences the knowledge. This distinction says for the first time that self-deception cannot be removed by knowledge alone. Everyone who reads the warning on the cigarette packet and lights a cigarette confirms Aristotle.

Plato: the chained are together. The allegory of the cave in the seventh book of the Republic sees for the first time the collective dimension of self-deception. Those in the cave take the shadows for the real; but they do this together. They organise competitions about the shadows, and give a prize to the best predictor of shadows. When someone who has gone outside and seen the sun comes back, they find him ridiculous; if he insists, they want to kill him. Three lessons: error is a system, the system has its own rewards, and leaving the system gives pain. Plato's lack is that he does not ask who sets the shadows in motion; there are people passing the puppets in front of the fire, and the allegory is silent about them.

Thucydides: hope, the consolation of danger. In the Melian dialogue the Athenian envoys say this to the Melians, who refuse to surrender: "Hope is a consolation in the moment of danger; those who stake everything understand what it is only after they have been ruined." The Melians believe that the Spartans will come to their aid; they do not come. The Athenians, a year later, mount an expedition to Sicily with the same hope, and lose their fleet. Self-deception is the illness of the powerless and of the powerful alike. In the same work, while recounting the civil war at Corcyra, Thucydides writes how the meanings of words changed: "Thoughtless daring was counted as loyalty to one's comrades; prudent hesitation, as cowardice."

5. The Stoa, Epicurus, Augustine: Looking inward and outward

The Stoics. The fifth section of Epictetus's Enchiridion: "It is not events that trouble people, but their judgements about events." According to the Stoa, the only thing that depends on us is our judgements, and error is to see what does not depend on us as if it depended on us. The Stoics' contribution is to have set self-deception up as a problem of judgement; their lack is that they do not see the social conditions of judgement. That the slave Epictetus and the emperor Marcus Aurelius shared the same philosophy is the ironic proof of this lack: philosophy said to both of them "do not grieve for what is not in your hands", but what was in their hands was not the same.

Epicurus and Lucretius. Epicurus says that unhappiness is fed by two fears: the fear of the gods and the fear of death; both are products of self-deception. In On the Nature of Things, Lucretius tells, through the sacrifice of Iphigenia, "how much evil" religion "was able to persuade people to". This line begins a path that reaches to Feuerbach and to Marx: illusions are born of needs; without understanding the need, you cannot disperse the illusion.

Augustine. In the eighth book of the Confessions he reports a prayer he made in his youth: "Grant me chastity and self-mastery, but not yet." The human being at one and the same time both wants and does not want; the will is two parts, and one of the parts deceives the other. Christian theology called this "sin"; one thousand five hundred years later Freud would say "repression", and Sartre "bad faith".

6. The Middle Ages: al-Ghazali's doubt, Ibn Khaldun's list

Al-Ghazali. At the end of the eleventh century, Baghdad's most famous professor passes through a crisis and leaves his chair. What he notices in Deliverance from Error is this: the Christian child grows up a Christian, the Jewish child a Jew, the Muslim child a Muslim; the source of belief is one's surroundings, that is, imitation. Belief acquired by imitation is not knowledge. Five hundred years before Descartes, al-Ghazali tries radical doubt as a method. The place he arrives at is Sufism, but what matters for us is the reason for setting out: the most widespread form of self-deception is to take for knowledge what has never been questioned.

Ibn Khaldun. The introduction to the Muqaddimah, written in 1377, is one of the most brilliant texts in the history of self-deception. Ibn Khaldun asks why historians transmit false reports, and he lists: partisanship for a view; excessive trust in those who transmit; being unable to grasp the aim of the report; a groundless belief in its truth; not knowing the conditions of the events; the wish to curry favour with those of high station; and, most important, not knowing the laws of social life (umran). Then he gives an example. Historians write that Moses's army was more than six hundred thousand soldiers. Ibn Khaldun calculates: an army of this size could not be fed in that geography, and could not march; even the army of the Persian empire was smaller than this. The figure had grown by being passed on and passed on, and no one had asked. This is the first check of a "base rate". When the items "partisanship", "currying favour with the powerful" and "not knowing the laws of society" on the list are read together, there emerges the draft of a theory of ideology written five hundred years before Marx.

7. The Renaissance and early modernity: Doubt becomes a method

Montaigne. In the essay "Of Cannibals": "Everyone calls barbarism that which is not in his own custom." While Europeans look with horror at the natives' eating a dead enemy, they do not see that their own inquisitions burn the living human being.

Bacon's idols. In the Novum Organum of 1620, Bacon counts four "idols" that mislead the mind; they coincide with today's psychology to a surprising degree. Idols of the Tribe: the common errors of the human species; Bacon speaks of the mind's tendency "to assume more order than there is" (apophenia), and says that "once the mind has adopted a view, it gathers everything in order to support it" (the definition of confirmation bias, dated 1620). Idols of the Cave: errors that come from the individual's education and temperament. Idols of the Market: the misleadings of language; words give a name to things that do not exist, or cover different things with the same name. When on this blog we set out Why We Are Done Saying "the Woman Problem" and "the Kurdish Problem", we were in fact speaking of the Idols of the Market. Idols of the Theatre: errors that come from ready-made systems and from authorities; worlds that have been staged. Bacon's importance is that he takes error out of being a personal fault and sees it as a structure to be overcome by method; his lack is that he does not ask who built the language and the stage.

Descartes. In 1641, in the Meditations, he doubts everything, supposes that an "evil demon" is continually deceiving him, and stops only in the certainty of his existence as the one who doubts. Bacon comes from outside, Descartes from inside; both take doubt out of being a state of mind and turn it into a procedure. Modern science is born where these two paths cross.

Osiander's preface. In 1543, as Copernicus's book was being printed, the theologian Osiander added an unsigned preface: the sun-centred system is not claiming the truth, only a hypothesis that provides ease of calculation. Copernicus did not think so. This is the historical example of a formula an institution found in order not to face the truth: save the phenomenon, do not ask the essence. The same formula brought Galileo to his knees in 1633, and today it lives in the difference between the "internal company report" and the "public statement".

Pascal. He writes that the human being's greatest trouble is "being unable to sit quietly in a room". He runs after the hunt but does not want the hare; he plays the game but does not want the money; what he wants is not to think of himself. He calls this divertissement, diversion: everything we have invented in order not to think that we are mortal and weak. "The heart has its reasons which reason does not know": the causes of our judgements are not what we say while we are justifying them.

La Rochefoucauld. The 119th of the Maxims of 1665 is the shortest definition of the subject: "We have grown so accustomed to concealing ourselves from others that in the end we conceal ourselves from ourselves as well." The second gives the mechanism: "Self-love is the greatest of flatterers." The thesis that the evolutionary biologist Robert Trivers would establish in 2011 (we deceive ourselves in order to deceive others better; one who believes his own lie is convincing) had been established by observation in the Paris salons of the seventeenth century.

Three collective errors. In 1637, in the Netherlands, a single tulip bulb was sold for the price of a house, and within weeks the prices collapsed. In 1720, in London, the shares of the South Sea Company rose tenfold and collapsed, without the company having any real trade. In 1692, in Salem, accusations of witchcraft that began with the fits of a few young girls ended in the execution of twenty people, on the claim that "spectres appeared to the victims" ("spectral evidence"). The common structure of the three: the ground of the judgement is that others too judge thus. A bubble is everyone's believing what everyone believes. In 1841 Charles Mackay gathered these in the book Extraordinary Popular Delusions and the Madness of Crowds; his lack was that he did not ask who inflated the bubble. The directors of the South Sea had sold the shares at the top.

8. The Enlightenment and the nineteenth century: The question becomes social

Hume: we have never seen causality. In 1739, in A Treatise of Human Nature, Hume made a disturbing observation: we never observe causality; what we observe is that B comes after A, and that this repeats. When we see a "constant conjunction", our mind says by habit "A is the cause of B". This is the deepest layer of the question of self-deception: the mind makes the passage from correlation to causality as its default setting. We have to expend effort in order not to think causality. False correlation is the result of a reflex that operates at every moment we are not attending. The Marxist tradition catches the problem from another place: we know causality not by observing, but by intervening. When we ban ice cream and see that the drownings continue, we learn that ice cream is not the cause.

Kant. "What Is Enlightenment?", of 1784, defines enlightenment as "the human being's emergence from his self-incurred state of immaturity". The phrase "self-incurred" matters: immaturity arises not from a lack of reason, but from a lack of the courage to use reason; to be under tutelage is comfortable. Kant here diagnoses the comfort of self-deception. In The Metaphysics of Morals he counts the inner lie the greatest moral fault: one who lies to another spoils a relation; one who lies to himself spoils reason itself.

Hegel. In the preface to the Phenomenology of Spirit: "What is familiar, because it is familiar, is not known." The things we see every day, the things we count as "natural", are for that very reason not thought. The wage, the market, the state, the family. This sentence is the methodological point of departure of Marx's analysis of fetishism: science begins by estranging what is familiar.

Feuerbach and Marx. In 1841 Feuerbach said that God is the projected form of the human being's own essence. Marx went one step further: Feuerbach had explained the illusion, but had not explained why the illusion was necessary. Religion is "the opium of the people", but in the same sentence "the heart of a heartless world, the spirit of spiritless conditions". In order to disperse the illusion, the conditions that need the illusion have to be changed. We shall take up Marx's real contribution separately below, in the third part.

Nietzsche. Beyond Good and Evil, 68: "'I did this,' says my memory. 'I cannot have done this,' says my pride, and it does not step back. In the end memory yields." Nietzsche counts truth itself as a product of self-deception: "illusions of which it has been forgotten that they are illusions". The diagnosis is right; the cure is dangerous; the criterion of truth disappears. But the diagnosis remains: pride defeats memory.

Dostoevsky and Ibsen. In The Brothers Karamazov, Zosima says to Fyodor Pavlovich: "Above all, do not lie to yourself. The person who lies to himself and listens to his own lie in the end becomes unable to distinguish the truth either in himself or around him." Ibsen, in The Wild Duck of 1884, seems to say the reverse: Doctor Relling says, "If you take the life-lie from the ordinary person, you take his happiness too," and Gregers, the idealist who imposes the truth, causes a family's ruin. The two should be read together: to lie to oneself is destructive; but to tear the lie out without method and without solidarity is so as well.

Freud. He described self-deception for the first time as a system: repression, denial, projection, rationalisation (the rationalisation named in 1908 by his student Ernest Jones: to say not the real reason for what we do, but an acceptable reason for it). His contribution is to have shown that self-deception has a function: it protects the ego. His lack is that he does not ask in which society, and in which class, this ego lives.

Semmelweis: where the evidence was not enough. In 1847, at the Vienna General Hospital, the young physician Ignaz Semmelweis examines the difference in death rates between two maternity clinics. Deaths from puerperal fever in the clinic where the physicians worked are several times those in the clinic where the midwives worked. He finds the cause: in the morning the physicians perform autopsies and pass into the maternity ward without washing their hands. He makes washing the hands with chlorinated water compulsory; the death rate falls from the tens of per cent to below one per cent. The data are clear. The response is refusal: the physicians cannot accept the idea that they themselves are killing the patients. A remark attributed to an American professor sums up the spirit of the period: "Physicians are gentlemen, and gentlemen's hands are clean." Semmelweis is removed from the hospital, and dies in 1865 in a mental hospital. This case is the purest laboratory example of self-deception: there is evidence; to accept the evidence means to accuse oneself; and the profession chooses its honour in place of the evidence.

9. The twentieth century: Concepts and catastrophes

Lukács: reification. History and Class Consciousness, of 1923, extends Marx's analysis of fetishism to the whole of social life. Under capitalism, relations among human beings appear as relations among things: the worker sees his own labour-power as a commodity sold on the market, the jurist takes the law for a system independent of interests, the economist examines the market like a law of nature. Lukács's concept of "imputed consciousness" gives an important tool: the distance between the consciousness required by a class's real position and the consciousness its members actually carry is the measure of ideology.

Gramsci: common sense and good sense. In the Prison Notebooks Gramsci distinguishes "common sense" (senso comune) from "good sense" (buon senso). Common sense is the heap of fragmentary, contradictory beliefs that everyone shares without questioning: "those who work, earn", "everyone draws his own fate", "so it has come, so it goes". Good sense is the healthy kernel inside this heap; philosophy's task is not to demolish common sense, but to turn the good sense inside it into a coherent view of the world. False correlations are the building-blocks of common sense; each is small on its own, and together they are a class's way of reading the world in its own favour.

Sartre: bad faith. Famous examples in the "Bad Faith" section of Being and Nothingness: the waiter in the café, his movements a little too definite, a little too quick; he plays at being a waiter, he wants to be a waiter as a stone is a stone, because he is fleeing the weight of his freedom. The woman on a first meeting notices that the man is holding her hand, but does not withdraw it; she separates her consciousness from her body. Bad faith makes use of the human being's being both facticity and transcendence: when he wants to flee responsibility he says "this is what I am"; when he does not want to be pinned into an identity he says "I am not this". Sartre's lack is Lukács's surplus: why does the waiter play at being a waiter? Because the customer wants it so, and he does not want to lose his job. Bad faith is the individual's escape; but the place escaped from is a class's conditions.

Orwell: doublethink. Doublethink in 1984 is to carry two contradictory beliefs at the same time and to believe both. In "Politics and the English Language": political language "is designed in such a way as to make lies sound true and murder respectable". The words "pacification" and "transfer of population" make it possible to speak of the bombing of villages without thinking. Bad language is the instrument of self-deception; to take care with language is a political task.

Arendt: thoughtlessness, and the lie in politics. Arendt, who followed the Eichmann trial in 1963, wrote that evil can be "banal": Eichmann was not a fanatic, but an official who spoke in clichés and lacked the capacity to think what he had done from the point of view of someone else; she called this "thoughtlessness". In 1971 the essay "Lying in Politics", on the Pentagon Papers, goes further: those who conducted the Vietnam War did not believe their own reports; but in order to serve the "image" they had built, they ignored the real data. Arendt calls this "defactualisation", and marks the real danger: one who deceives others comes, after a time, to believe his own deception; because to believe is easier than to keep the lie going. It held also for the governments that in 2003 believed it "certain" that weapons of mass destruction would be found in Iraq; the Chilcot Report of 2016 wrote that the British government had presented judgements "with a certainty that could not be justified".

The catastrophes of the century.

Lysenko (1948). In the Soviet Union, Trofim Lysenko, with the support of the party, made into official doctrine his line rejecting Mendelian genetics as "bourgeois science"; research in genetics was banned, and agriculture was damaged. This has to be said plainly: socialism's own history is not exempt from self-deception either. The rejection of evidence by a class label can be our illness too. Lenin's phrase, "the living soul of Marxism is the concrete analysis of a concrete situation", was written precisely against this illness.

Challenger (1986). The space shuttle exploded 73 seconds after it was launched; seven astronauts died. Richard Feynman, the physicist on the commission, wrote this in an appendix to the report: "For a successful technology, reality must come before public relations, because nature cannot be fooled." The engineers knew that the seals could fail in the cold, and wanted a postponement; the managers chose the calendar. The sociologist Diane Vaughan named this process "the normalisation of deviance": when each small risk is accepted, the next appears smaller. The difference between Semmelweis's hospital and NASA is only the technology.

"Doubt is our product" (1969). An internal note of the tobacco company Brown & Williamson: "Doubt is our product, because it is the best way of competing with the 'body of fact' that exists in the mind of the public." The cigarette–cancer link had been known since the 1950s; instead of rejecting the correlation, the industry produced doubt by saying "not yet certain", and it did this by providing funds to scientists, to associations and to think tanks. This is a new stage in the history of self-deception: error no longer arises only from the mind or from the structure; it is produced as an industry. The same method was used for climate, sugar, asbestos and lead (Oreskes and Conway, Merchants of Doubt).

Greenspan (2008). On 23 October 2008, before the United States House of Representatives, Alan Greenspan, former chairman of the Federal Reserve: "I have found a flaw in the model that I regarded as the critical structure defining how the world works." For forty years he had believed that the markets would regulate themselves, and had used this belief as evidence. But the "flaw" was found, and the model did not change; the crisis closed by increasing the wealth of the richest. The price of self-deception is paid not by those who are deceived, but by others.


Part Three: The Marxist Ground and the Age of the Algorithm

10. Marx: The social ground of being deceived

What I have recounted up to here were approaches that look for self-deception largely in the individual's mind, or in his existence. All of them are right, and all of them are incomplete. Because they do not answer this question: when the mind is able to err in every direction, why does it always err in the same direction? Why do false correlations not scatter at random, but insistently accuse the poor and acquit the rich? Confirmation bias does not explain what we want to confirm; to explain that, one has to step outside the mind.

Camera obscura. In The German Ideology (1845–46), Marx and Engels liken ideology to a dark room: in this room, human beings and their relations appear upside down. But this inverted image is not a lie; just as the image falls inverted on the retina, it is born of the life-process itself. Ideology is not a trick inserted into the head from outside; it is the way real relations show themselves.

Fetishism: "They do not know, but they do it." In the first chapter of Capital, Marx gives the finest example of this. On the market, commodities are exchanged with one another; value appears as a natural property of the commodities, whereas it is a relation of social labour. A relation among human beings appears as a relation among things. This is an objective illusion: everyone, the most knowledgeable economist included, has to behave thus on the market. The owners of commodities, while exchanging their products, are not aware that they are equating their labours: "They do not know this, but they do it." Here the error is not in the head; it is in practice. People do not act wrongly because they think wrongly; they think in a particular way because they act in a particular way. The debate that has continued since Socrates, "is it knowledge, or is it the will?", is carried onto a new ground: neither knowledge nor the will; practice.

Let us say it in the language of false correlation. The wage appears as "the price of labour"; the worker works eight hours, and it is as if he receives the equivalent of the eight hours. Yet what he receives is the cost of reproducing labour-power; in one part of the day he produces his own wage, and in the remainder he produces surplus-value without equivalent. Profit appears as "the yield of capital"; yet this is the unpaid portion. The correlation has been set up wrongly: profit is correlated not with capital, but with unpaid labour. Statistics do not suffice to correct this false correlation; one has to look at the relation of production itself. In the third volume of Capital, Marx sums it up: "If the appearance and the essence of things coincided directly, science of every kind would be superfluous." That we deceive ourselves comes not from our stupidity, but from the society we live in showing itself to us inverted.

The Eighteenth Brumaire: error as costume. The revolutionaries of 1848 deceived themselves by wearing the costumes of the Roman republic; the French peasants saw in Bonaparte their own representative, whereas Bonaparte was the protector of the order that crushed them by the mortgage. "People make their own history, but not under conditions of their own choosing." Self-deception is the costume that conditions dress upon the person.

Engels: false consciousness. In the letter he wrote to Franz Mehring on 14 July 1893, Engels: "Ideology is a process conducted consciously by the so-called thinker, but with a false consciousness. The real motives that set him in motion remain unknown to him; otherwise this would not be an ideological process." This sentence takes self-deception out of being a problem of intention. The economist who says "the minimum wage creates inflation" may not be lying; but he does not know why he thinks so: his question is capital's question, his data are capital's data, his screen is capital's screen. Spinoza had said this on the metaphysical plane two hundred years earlier: human beings are conscious of their desires, but unaware of the causes that determine those desires. Marx carried the same structure onto the social plane.

11. Belief in a just world: The most persistent groundless judgement

The finding of social psychology that most supports Marxist analysis is the work of Melvin Lerner. The title of the book he published in 1980 is plain: The Belief in a Just World: A Fundamental Delusion. In his experiments he showed that subjects watching someone who suffers unjustly begin, when they cannot stop the suffering, to belittle the victim. The logic is this: if the world is just, the one who suffers must have deserved it; otherwise it means that I too am unprotected.

This finding explains why the judgement "the poor are lazy" is so resistant. The judgement rests not on data, but on a need: the need to believe that my own position is safe, deserved and lasting. That the poor person should be guilty is necessary in order that I should be innocent. In 1994 John Jost and Mahzarin Banaji carried this into "system justification theory": people are inclined to justify the order they live in as well, and this inclination is seen even among those harmed by the order. The poor supporting the reduction of taxes on the rich, and workers voting for parties hostile to workers, are phenomena that this theory tries to explain; Jost openly accepts the kinship of his theory with Engels's concept of false consciousness.

The "cognitive dissonance" that Leon Festinger found in 1956, by following a group that awaited the apocalypse, looks to the same place: when the prophecy did not come to pass, the group did not abandon its belief; it defended it more fervently. When belief and fact conflict, most of the time it is not the fact that wins, but the belief, because to change the belief is to change one's identity.

The lesson that comes out of this is as follows. A groundless judgement does not arise from a lack of knowledge; nor can it be removed by giving knowledge. The person before whom you place the statistics of poverty begins, "but I know someone I know, who..." Because a judgement is not knowledge; it is a defence. To lift the defence, insecurity has to be lifted; and to lift insecurity is not an individual work, but a social one. The organised worker does not have to accuse his neighbour in order to defend himself; he has his union. And it is not enough to show that a judgement is groundless; one has also to show whose interest it serves. The question cui bono (who benefits) is the fourth question to be added to Hume's three.

12. The age of the algorithm: The factory of correlation

What I have recounted up to here were the errors of the human mind and of society. Now machines produce the correlations, and these machines do not ask causality.

In 2008 Chris Anderson, an editor at Wired, published an essay titled "The End of Theory": if you have enough data, there is no need of a model, a hypothesis, a theory; correlation is enough. "Google does not need to know why one page is better; if the statistics say so, then it is so." This is Hume's problem rewritten in a technological language: without knowing causality, and relying only on constant conjunction, can we govern the world?

Eighteen years later, we know the answer. Recommendation algorithms work by the correlation "those who watched this video also watched that", and they carry the user towards ever more extreme content; because the correlation is built with what captures attention, not with what is true. Crime-prediction software finds more records of crime in the neighbourhoods where the police patrol more, and sends more police there; the correlation confirms itself. Large language models are the most developed form of this logic: a vast statistic of which word comes after which word. When you ask the model "why", you receive the statistical average of the answers that have been given to the question "why". This is what we said when writing on The Philosophical Trap in Evrim Ağacı's AGI Video and Whom Is the University For? Artificial Intelligence, Cognitive Surrender and the Class of Thinking: to call a correlation machine reason is to institutionalise, as a species, the error of which Hume warned.

The real matter is here: these factories have an owner. A handful of companies decides which correlation will be shown to us, and which piece of news will be made available. We saw it while recounting Meta in Brazil, Access Bans in Turkey: An Algorithmic History and Technical Anatomy of Elections and They Walked Past the Algorithm: How the Plenum Beat the Ballot Box in Serbia: Bacon's Idols of the Theatre are no longer a stage, but the screen in our pocket. The oracle of Delphi was given to Croesus once; Croesus himself misread it. Today's recommendation algorithm notices Croesus's misreading, and every day sends him a thousand oracles confirming the same misreading. The tobacco industry produced doubt as a product; the platforms produce confirmation as a product. Harry Frankfurt's essay of 2005, On Bullshit, defined the genre of the age: the liar knows the truth and conceals it; the one who talks bullshit does not care about the truth, and cares only about the effect. Self-deception has ceased to be an inner process and has turned into a service: they sell you, in a scalable way, what you want to believe.


Part Four: Synthesis and the Way Out

13. Three layers

Let us gather up an inquiry of twenty-five centuries. Self-deception has three layers, and each age brought one of them to the fore.

The first layer: the mind. Hume, Bacon, Kahneman. Our mind is built in order to decide quickly; to take correlation for causality, to confirm what one believes, to take the striking for the probable, are its default settings. This layer explains the possibility of error.

The second layer: existence. Augustine, Pascal, Kierkegaard, Sartre. We are free and mortal; we want to flee the weight of responsibility. We play at being the waiter, we divert ourselves, we say "this is what I am". This layer explains the motive of error: we want to err, because the truth is heavy.

The third layer: society. Ibn Khaldun, Marx, Lukács, Gramsci, Arendt. The relations we live in show themselves to us inverted, and the continuance of this inversion serves someone's interest; they, for their part, produce doubt, diversion and confirmation as an industry. This layer explains the direction of error.

The Marxist position does not say that the third layer swallows the first two; it says that the first two remain incomplete without the third. Kahneman's biases are real, but they do not explain what we want to confirm. Sartre's bad faith is real, but it does not explain why the waiter is a waiter. Without the third layer, self-deception appears as a fate of human nature; together with the third layer, it appears as a social arrangement that can be changed.

The cure, too, has three layers. At the level of the mind, method: Ibn Khaldun's criteria, Bacon's list of idols, the three questions of statistics. At the level of existence, courage: Kant's call to "dare to use your reason", Dostoevsky's warning to "first, not lie to yourself". At the level of society, organising: to change the conditions that make the lie necessary. Without this third, the first two remain an individual tragedy, as with Semmelweis dying in a mental hospital with his correct statistics.

14. There is no person who thinks correctly alone

To say to ourselves "be more careful" is not enough; the first victim of confirmation bias is the person who believes himself free of it. The way out is not individual.

The genius of the scientific method lies in this acceptance: it assumes that the individual cannot see his own prejudice, and it distributes the check to the community. You write the hypothesis openly, so that you cannot change it afterwards. You open the data, so that someone else may look. You write the method, so that someone else may repeat it. You give the result to your peers, so that they may try to refute it. Science is not the sum of honest individuals; it is an organisation that makes honesty compulsory. This is why, writing on What Is International Open Access Week, and Why Does It Matter? and OpenAI's 722 Mathematics Papers and the Closed Laboratory of the General Intellect, we maintained the following: the question of who checks the evidence is the question of the ownership of knowledge. Evidence that cannot be checked is institutionalised self-deception.

In every age a method was invented against self-deception: Socrates's dialogue, Ibn Khaldun's criteria, Bacon's method, Semmelweis's statistics, Marx's critique, Feynman's sentence that "nature cannot be fooled". What all of them share is that the individual does not trust his own eye, and carries the check outside: to the dialogue, to the record, to repetition, to the evidence, to the collective experience of the class, to the resistance of nature. The same principle holds for politics. At a union meeting, in a neighbourhood assembly, at the table of a philosophy community, there is someone who will throw your false correlation in your face. When you are left alone, there is only the screen, and the screen tells you that you are right.

And the last word belongs to practice. Marx's second thesis on Feuerbach: whether objective truth can be attributed to human thinking is not a theoretical problem, but a practical one. The one who bans ice cream and sees that the drownings continue finds the hidden variable. The one who freezes the rent and sees that prices fall learns to hold responsible not the tenant, but the rentier. The worker who organises and raises his wage learns the groundlessness of the judgement "those who work, earn" not from the statistical table, but from his own payslip. Practice is the only place that makes visible the causality Hume never managed to see; because in practice we do not look on, we intervene, and the world resists us. That resistance is the touch of truth.


Ages and Answers

AgeHow the question was askedThe answer givenHistorical example
Ancient GreeceNot knowing, or knowing and not doing?Socrates: ignorance; Aristotle: akrasia; Plato: the collective chainCroesus's oracle, the Sicilian Expedition
Hellenistic–RomanWhat troubles us?The Stoa: our judgements; Epicurus: gods produced by fearAugustine's prayer of "not yet"
The Middle AgesHow do we know that we know?Al-Ghazali: imitation is not knowledge; Ibn Khaldun: seven causes of errorThe legend of an army of 600,000
Early modernityCan doubt be a method?Bacon: the idols; Descartes: the evil demon; Pascal: diversion; La Rochefoucauld: self-loveTulip mania, the South Sea bubble, Salem
Enlightenment–19th centuryWhere is the soil of error?Hume: habit; Kant: lack of courage; Hegel: what is familiar is not known; Marx: practice and ideology; Nietzsche: pride; Freud: defenceSemmelweis, the 18th Brumaire
The 20th centuryHow do institutions deceive themselves?Lukács: reification; Gramsci: common sense; Sartre: bad faith; Orwell: doublethink; Arendt: thoughtlessness; Lerner: the just worldLysenko, Vietnam, Challenger, the tobacco note, Greenspan
TodayHow is error produced?Frankfurt: bullshit; machines of correlation, the industry of doubt and of confirmationRecommendation algorithms, Iraq 2003

Two Minds

The mind that deceives itselfThe mind under test
Takes what it sees together for each other's causeAsks the questions of direction, hidden variable and chance
Seeks the evidence that confirms what it believesSeeks the evidence that would refute what it believes
Generalises from stories of successCounts those who cannot speak, and the aircraft that did not return
Looks at the striking case, and forgets the base rateFirst asks "how many out of how many?"
Ties the evil to the victim's characterTies the evil to conditions and to relations
Wants to believe that the world is justAccepts that the world is not just, and tries to change it
Asks "who is right?"Also asks "who benefits?"
Takes what the screen shows for the realAsks who built the screen
Thinks alone, and decides aloneThinks in a community, and opens itself to criticism
Knows what is correct by feeling itTests what is correct in practice

Discussion Questions for Tomorrow Evening

Socrates, or Aristotle? Is self-deception a problem of knowledge, or a problem of knowing and yet not doing? Why does the warning on the cigarette packet not work? Your answer sets the limit of the optimism that "we can put it right by giving knowledge".

Who sets the shadows in motion in Plato's cave? Why is the allegory silent about the puppeteers? The wish to kill the one who has come out of the cave resembles which event today?

Are Ibn Khaldun's seven causes valid today? Apply his list to today's media and to social media. Which item is at work the most?

Why did Semmelweis lose? He had the evidence; his statistics were correct. Is what explains his losing his personality, the interest of the professional institution, or the period's understanding of science? Do these three explanations exclude one another?

Is Ibsen right? He says that if you take away the life-lie, you take away happiness too. Are there situations in which the truth is destructive? If there are, how should the truth be told?

"They do not know, but they do it." Marx's sentence carries self-deception from the head into practice. If this is right, the way of correcting the error must also pass through practice. Which concrete action refutes which widespread false correlation?

Is Lysenko our error? How should we face socialism's history of deceiving itself? Can "the concrete analysis of a concrete situation" prevent this?

"Nature cannot be fooled." Can society be fooled? For how long? Where does the resistance of social reality appear?

If doubt is a product, is confirmation a product too? From the tobacco industry to social media, at what stage is the industrial production of error? What can be set against it?

The three layers: mind, existence, society. Without which layer does the explanation remain incomplete? One who brings a layer to the fore, what does he lose from the others?


Concrete Tasks

The habit of four questions. When you hear a correlation (in the news, in conversation, in your own head), make four questions into a reflex. Which way does the direction run? Is there a third thing moving both at once? How many cases does this rest on? Whose interest does it serve that I believe this correlation?

The exercise of refutation. Once a month, choose the political or social judgement you believe the most, and deliberately seek the strongest evidence that would refute it. Do what Wason's subjects did not do: try 1-2-3.

Ask the base rate. When you hear a judgement such as "immigrant crime has increased", "the young do not want to work", "the unionised worker is lazy", one question: how many out of how many? If there is no figure, there is no judgement.

A count against survivorship bias. When you hear a story of success, count those who tried the same path and did not succeed. Set beside the stories of entrepreneurship the number of businesses that closed.

Carry Ibn Khaldun's list. Write the seven causes on a sheet of paper; while you read a news item, a column, a social-media feed, mark which of them are at work.

Break the feed. Once a week, deliberately read a source that would never be recommended to you. To step outside the circle drawn by the recommendation algorithm is the only way to take back your availability heuristic.

Think together. Have a community that will say your false correlation to your face. Philosophy communities such as MARFET, reading groups and union education are for this. The one who thinks alone thinks with the screen.

Go out into practice. Test the judgement of which you are most sure by doing something on the strength of it. A signature campaign in the neighbourhood, a demand at the workplace, a network of solidarity. The resistance the world gives you teaches, more quickly than books do, which of your judgements has a ground.


Dear young comrades,

Why do we deceive ourselves? Because our mind is built in order to decide quickly, and to take correlation for causality is its default setting. Because the truth is heavy, and in order to flee it we play at being the waiter, we divert ourselves, we say "this is what I am". Because the society we live in shows itself to us inverted; the product of labour appears as the yield of capital, and relations appear as things. Because to believe that the world is just is easier than to bear injustice. And because there are now factories that sell these errors to us in a scalable way.

From Croesus to Greenspan, the history of self-deception is at the same time the history of the methods invented against it. Each age saw one layer of error and developed a tool against it; none sufficed on its own, but when they are added to one another there is today a working toolbox in our hands. The most important piece in the box is not a tool; it is a principle: do not trust your own eye, carry the check outside. The person who is alone errs, and cannot see that he has erred; this has not changed, from Plato's cave to the management room of Challenger. The only thing that has changed is the power of those who produce the error. Against that power it is not enough to be careful one by one; attention has to be organised.

The same question has to be asked the other way about as well: why do we sometimes stop deceiving ourselves? The answer is in the moments when we are not alone. At the table where someone says "stop, that correlation is wrong". In the laboratory where the data are opened and the method is shared. In the union room where workers say to one another, "the boss called us a family, but the payslip does not say so". Self-deception is the illness of solitude; its treatment is organised doubt.

Tomorrow evening at six, a table is being laid at Daima, in İçmeler. If you are in Marmaris, go; if you are not, lay your own table. Philosophy is not the art of finding the truth on one's own; it is the art of coming out of error together.

Knowledge belongs to everyone.


Sources

Antiquity
  • Herodotus, Histories, Book I, 53-91 (Croesus and the oracle). Turkish translation: trans. Müntekim Ökmen, İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları.
  • Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, Book III, 82-83 (Corcyra), Book V, 84-116 (the Melian dialogue). Turkish translation: trans. Furkan Akderin, Belge Yayınları.
  • Plato, Protagoras, 352-358; Republic, Book VII, 514a-521b. Turkish translations: İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları.
  • Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Book VII. Turkish translation: trans. Saffet Babür, BilgeSu.
  • Epictetus, Enchiridion, section 5; Seneca, On Anger; Lucretius, On the Nature of Things, Book I, 80-101. Turkish translations: Şule; İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları.
  • Augustine, Confessions, Book VIII, 7. Turkish translation: trans. Çiğdem Dürüşken, Alfa.
The Middle Ages
  • Al-Ghazali, Deliverance from Error (el-Munkız mine'd-Dalal). Turkish translation: trans. Abdürrezzak Tek, Emin Yayınları.
  • Ibn Khaldun, Muqaddimah, Introduction and Book I. Turkish translation: trans. Süleyman Uludağ, Dergâh Yayınları.
Early modernity
  • Montaigne, Essays, Book I, 31. Turkish translation: İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları.
  • Francis Bacon, Novum Organum (1620), Book I, 38-68. Turkish translation: trans. Sema Önal, Say.
  • René Descartes, Meditations (1641). Turkish translation: trans. Çiğdem Dürüşken, Alfa.
  • Baruch Spinoza, Ethics (1677), Part I, Appendix. Turkish translation: trans. Çiğdem Dürüşken, Alfa.
  • Blaise Pascal, Pensées. Turkish translation: trans. Devrim Çetinkasap, İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları.
  • La Rochefoucauld, Maxims (1665), 2 and 119. Turkish translation: Özdeyişler, trans. Tahsin Yücel, İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları.
  • Charles Mackay, Extraordinary Popular Delusions and the Madness of Crowds (1841). Turkish translation: Scala.
  • For Osiander's preface: Thomas Kuhn, The Copernican Revolution (1957). Turkish translation: İmge.
The Enlightenment and the 19th century
  • David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature (1739), Book I, Part III; An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding (1748). Turkish translations: Bilgesu; Say.
  • Immanuel Kant, "An Answer to the Question: What Is Enlightenment?" (1784); The Metaphysics of Morals, Doctrine of Virtue, §9. Turkish translations: Toplumsal Dönüşüm; Fol.
  • G. W. F. Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit (1807), Preface. Turkish translation: trans. Aziz Yardımlı, İdea.
  • Ludwig Feuerbach, The Essence of Christianity (1841). Turkish translation: Öteki.
  • Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The German Ideology (1845-46), Part I. Turkish translation: Sol; Evrensel Basım Yayın.
  • Karl Marx, Theses on Feuerbach (1845), Thesis II; "A Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right, Introduction" (1843-44); The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte (1852); Capital, Volume I, Chapter 1, Section 4 ("The Fetish Character of the Commodity"); Capital, Volume III, Chapter 48. Turkish translations: Sol; Yordam Kitap.
  • Friedrich Engels, letter to Franz Mehring, 14 July 1893. Marx and Engels, Selected Correspondence, Sol; the English text is on marxists.org.
  • Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil (1886), §68; "On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense" (1873). Turkish translations: Say; Pinhan.
  • Fyodor Dostoevsky, The Brothers Karamazov, Book II, Chapter 2; Notes from Underground. Turkish translations: İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları; İletişim.
  • Henrik Ibsen, The Wild Duck (1884), Act V. Turkish translation: Mitos-Boyut.
  • Ernest Jones, "Rationalization in Every-Day Life", Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 3 (1908); Anna Freud, The Ego and the Mechanisms of Defence (1936). Turkish translation: Metis.
  • For Semmelweis: Sherwin Nuland, The Doctors' Plague (2003).
The 20th century and after
  • Georg Lukács, History and Class Consciousness (1923). Turkish translation: trans. Yılmaz Öner, Belge.
  • Antonio Gramsci, Prison Notebooks, Notebook 11. Turkish translation: trans. Barış Baysal, Kalkedon.
  • Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness (1943), Part I, Chapter 2. Turkish translation: trans. Turhan Ilgaz and Gaye Çankaya Eksen, İthaki.
  • George Orwell, 1984 (1949); "Politics and the English Language" (1946). Turkish translations: Can; Sel.
  • Hannah Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil (1963); "Lying in Politics" (1971), in Crises of the Republic. Turkish translations: Metis; Dipnot.
  • Peter C. Wason, "On the Failure to Eliminate Hypotheses in a Conceptual Task", Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 12 (1960).
  • Leon Festinger, Henry Riecken and Stanley Schachter, When Prophecy Fails (1956); Festinger, A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance (1957).
  • Melvin J. Lerner, The Belief in a Just World: A Fundamental Delusion (Plenum, 1980).
  • John T. Jost and Mahzarin R. Banaji, "The Role of Stereotyping in System-Justification and the Production of False Consciousness", British Journal of Social Psychology, 33 (1994).
  • P. J. Bickel, E. A. Hammel and J. W. O'Connell, "Sex Bias in Graduate Admissions: Data from Berkeley", Science, 187 (1975).
  • Robert Matthews, "Storks Deliver Babies (p = 0.008)", Teaching Statistics, 22(2) (2000).
  • Daniel Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow (2011). Turkish translation: Varlık. For the replicability debate, Kahneman's open reply in 2017 to Ulrich Schimmack's blog post.
  • Robert Trivers, The Folly of Fools (2011). Turkish translation: Aptalların Budalalığı, Alfa.
  • Tyler Vigen, Spurious Correlations (2015) and tylervigen.com/spurious-correlations.
  • For Abraham Wald's study of aircraft armour: Jordan Ellenberg, How Not to Be Wrong (2014). Turkish translation: Yanılmamak İçin, Domingo.
  • For Lysenko: Loren Graham, Science in Russia and the Soviet Union (1993); V. I. Lenin, note on the journal Kommunismus (1920).
  • Richard Feynman, "Personal Observations on the Reliability of the Shuttle", Report of the Rogers Commission, Appendix F (1986); Diane Vaughan, The Challenger Launch Decision (1996).
  • Brown & Williamson, "Smoking and Health Proposal" (1969); Naomi Oreskes and Erik Conway, Merchants of Doubt (2010). Turkish translation: Şüphe Tacirleri, Koç Üniversitesi Yayınları.
  • Alan Greenspan's testimony of 23 October 2008 before the Oversight Committee of the House of Representatives; Sir John Chilcot, The Report of the Iraq Inquiry (2016), Executive Summary.
  • Chris Anderson, "The End of Theory", Wired, 23 June 2008; Cathy O'Neil, Weapons of Math Destruction (2016). Turkish translation: Matematiksel İmha Silahları, Nail Kitabevi.
  • Harry G. Frankfurt, On Bullshit (2005). Turkish translation: Boş Laf Üzerine, Zeplin.
Related essays from this blog

Event: "Why Do We Deceive Ourselves? False Correlations and Groundless Judgements", Marmaris Philosophy Community (MARFET), Friday, 30 October 2026, 18:00, Daima Cafe&Bar, İçmeler.


Bilgi Müşterekleri - Knowledge Belongs to Everyone. This essay is a living document. It will be updated with corrections and contributions. CC BY-SA 4.0.

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